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CAN'T PAY YOUR DEBTS, MATE?
A COMPARISON OF THE AUSTRALIAN AND
AMERICAN PERSONAL BANKRUPTCY SYSTEMS
by
PaulB. Lewis*
INTRODUCTION

The United States has one of the most debtor-friendly personal
bankruptcy vehicles in the industrialized world. At the heart of the
American system is the firmly-rooted belief in maintaining the
prospect of a fresh start for the honest but unfortunate debtor. Not
all bankruptcy regimes give such primacy to maintaining the fresh
start. In this Article, I compare the United States personal
bankruptcy approach to that utilized in Australia. While both
American and Australian bankruptcy law arose from the same
common law roots, the two systems now have significant differences
in their approach to personal bankruptcy.
The reasons for the disparities between the systems are
numerous. This Article examines some of the critical distinctions
and the justifications that have been proffered for each country's
approach. Part I provides some bankruptcy history. Part II briefly
outlines the current American approach to personal bankruptcy
under both chapter 7 and chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code. Part
III describes the personal bankruptcy system in Australia. Part IV
discusses the two most critical distinctions between the systems as
indicia of the significant underlying philosophical differences as to
what should form the core of personal bankruptcy law.

* Associate Professor, Mercer University Law School. Visiting Associate Professor, The
John Marshall Law School. BA-, Northwestern University,J.D., Yale University. Funding for
this research was provided by a grant from the David C. Lam Institute for East-West Studies. I
am indebted to many people in Australia. In particular, I thank George Caddy and Bob
Cruickshanks of the Insolvency and Trustee Service Australia. I also thank Amber Nickell,
Lisa Pagel, and Brian Holt for excellent research assistance.
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SOME BANKRUPTCY HISTORY

Australian and American bankruptcy law share the same
common law roots. American bankruptcy law, however, departed
markedly from the English model early in this country's history.
The result is a vast divergence between both the basic goals of
American and Australian bankruptcy law and the mechanisms used
to achieve those goals.
Bankruptcy law has Roman origins. The earliest bankruptcy
laws were entirely procreditor in nature; they allowed for either an
insolvent debtor or defrauded creditors to demand transfer of the
debtor's estate to the debtor's creditors.' Creditors had to elect one
of their own to manage the estate. The manager's primary duty was
to convey good tile to the property to a vendee. The manager
advertised the property for sale and sold the estate as a whole to the
highest bidder, who then succeeded to all of the rights and
obligations of the estate. Each step in the process was designed to
aid creditor recovery. Nothing in the law assisted rehabilitation of
the honest but unfortunate debtor," nor was such an end expressly
contemplated.
The earliest English "bankruptcy" statute, passed in 1542
during the reign of Henry VIII, 4 did little more than provide for
collective action proceedings for merchants' creditors. When a
debtor committed certain acts deemed to raise concerns over
whether conventional debt collection mechanisms could
successfully compel repayment, the statute provided additional
rights to creditors as a group which they did not individually
possess.! These acts of the debtor were called acts of bankruptcy.
When a debtor committed an act of bankruptcy, creditors could
petition the Lord Chancellor and request that the debtor's assets be

MAx RADIN, HANDBOOK OF ROMAN LAW 315 (1927).
2

Id.

Id. at 315-16. During the Middle Ages, the commercial cities in Italy began to develop
a form of collectivized debt collection to avoid fraud and facilitate equality among creditors.
These laws were an adaptation of Roman law's bankruptcy procedure where the entire
property of the debtor was divided equally among creditors. 8 WILLIAM HOLDSORTH, A
HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 229 (1966). See alsoJan H. Dalhuisen, The Development of Bankruptcy
in Western Europe in the Middle Ages, Renaissance, and Thereafter, Up to the Codification, in
EUROPEAN BANKRUPTCYLAWs 11, 13 (1 Arnold Ross ed., 1974).
4 See 34 & 35 Hen. 8, c. 4 (1542) (Eng.); 8 HOLDSWORTH, supra note
3, at 236.
See 34 & 35 Hen. 8, c. 4.
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gathered and distributed.6 If the creditors were still not fully repaid
as a result of this action, creditors retained the ability to resort to
those rights afforded individual creditors to compel payment.!
Again, the law had no debtor rehabilitation component; rather, it
was designed solely to prevent debtor fraud.
The first law designed as a true bankruptcy statute rather than
as a fraud prevention law was enacted in 1570.8 It applied only to
traders, 9 and it defined what should be regarded as acts of
bankruptcy. 10 The Chancellor was given authority to appoint an
individual with rights to exercise the powers of the Chancellor over
the bankrupt's person and property." These "commissioners"
essentially liquidated the debtor's assets and distributed the
proceeds from these assets to creditors.2 The law provided no
opportunity for discharge,13 and a debtor who committed fraudulent
acts of bankruptcy faced possible imprisonment.14
The concept of discharge first appeared in English law in the
early eighteenth century.' s According to the law, bankrupt traders
who surrendered to the commissioner and conformed to his
dictates or who were apprehended and then conformed were to "be
discharged from all debts by him, her, or them due at the time he,
she, or they did become bankrupt." 6 In addition, provisions

See id.
8 HOLDsvORTH, supranote 3, at 236-37.
13 Eliz., c. 7 (1570) (Eng.). The first English statute employing the term "bankrupt"
was enacted several years earlier. See 34 & 35 Hen. 8, c. 4 (1542-43) (Eng.).
' Others were treated merely as insolvents under common law. See Samuel Williston,
The Effect ofa NationalBankruptcy Law Upon the State Laws, 22 HARv. L. REv. 547,551 (1909).
10 13 Eliz., c. 7, § 1.
"Id. § 2.
"2 See Charles Jordan Tabb, The History of the Bankruptcy Laws in the United States, 3 Ai.
BANER. L. REv. 5, 8 (1995) [hereinafter Tabb, HistoryJ.
" The Act held that creditors who were not paid in full retained the right to proceed
against the future effects of the bankrupt for the unpaid balance. 13 Eliz., c. 7, §§ 9-10.
14
See 8 HOLDSWORTH, supranote 3, at 237. The focus of most bankruptcy legislation in
England in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries was to increase penalties on
noncompliant debtors. Debtor's homes could be invaded to assist in repayment, and
noncompliant debtors could be maimed. See, e.g., 21 Jam., c. 19, § 8 (1623); 1Jam., c. 15, § 9
(1604).
" See 4 Ann., c. 17, § 8 (1705) (Eng.). The bill wvas introduced in 1705, and this is the
date customarily cited. Discharge was available, though, only to traders, and the process could
only be invoked by creditors. SeeJohn C. McCoid, II, Discharge: The Most ImportantDevelopment
in Bankrupty History, 70 Ass. BANKR. L.J. 163, 163, n.2 (1996).
" 4Ann. c. 17, § 8.
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allowed for conforming bankrupts to not only obtain a discharge,
but also to receive a monetary allowance in 17the hopes they might
again become productive members of society.
At the time of the American Constitutional Convention, the
English statute in operation was the 1732 statute of George I1.8 This
law largely followed the lead of the Act of 1705 in attempting to
create incentives for compliance from debtors. Discharge and
retention of some property remained an option for the compliant
debtor; extremely harsh treatment remained the norm for the
noncompliant debtor. 9
Most English bankruptcy practices,
including the prospect of imprisonment for debt, were imported to
America and were widely used in the Colonies prior to the framing
of the Constitution. °
II. AMERICAN BANKRUPTCYLAW-A PRIMER
The United States Constitution gives Congress the right to
establish "uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout
the United States." 2' However, the Constitutional Convention
"7 Id. Debtors could receive an allowance, not to exceed 200 pounds, or 5 pounds per
hundred of the net estate recovered, so long as creditors received at least 8 shillings per
pound owed. Id. §§ 8-9. McCoid, supranote 15, at 167. It has been noted, however, that the
introduction of the discharge provision into English law served a creditor interest as well. By
demanding conformity in order to obtain discharge, the law was designed to ease creditor
recovery. See Charles Jordan Tabb, The HistoricalEvolution of the Bankruptcy Discharge, 65 AM.
BANKR. L.J. 325,336 (1991).
"
See5 Geo. 2, c. 30 (1732) (Eng.).
Though the laws remained procreditor throughout the seventeenth century in
England, a different attitude regarding bankrupts seemed to be appearing. For example,
according to Blackstone:
"A bankrupt. . . was formerly considered merely in the light of a criminal ....But at
present the laws of bankruptcy are considered as laws calculated for the benefit of
trade, and founded on the principles of humanity as well as justice; and to that end
they confer some privileges, not only on the creditors, but also on the bankrupt or
debtor himself."
2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 471-72 (1725). See also
Tabb, History, supranote 12, at 12.
"
See Ven Countryman, Bankruptcy and the Individual Debtor-And a Modest Proposal to
Return to the Seventeenth Century, 32 CATH. U. L. REv. 809, 812 (1983).
1 U.S. CONST. art., I, cl.
8. The Constitution almost did not do that; the bankruptcy
power was not included in the original draft of the Constitution. 3 JOSEPH STORY,
COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, § 1100 (Da Capo Press ed.,
1970). The subject was not even discussed until very late in the Convention when the
Bankruptcy power was proposed as an addition to the Full Faith and Credit Clause. See
CHARLES WARREN, BANKRUPTCYIN UNITED STATES HISTORY 4-5 (DeCapo Press ed., 1972).
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provided little guidance as to the substantive parameters of any
future bankruptcy law. The only objection to the bankruptcy power
set forth at the Convention was based on a desire to ensure that in
the United States-unlike in England at the time-debtors could
not be put to death.22
2' See 2 MAx FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 489 (Yale
University Press ed., 1966). Nor is there any suggestion as to why the Bankruptcy Clause is so
brief. Scholars have subsequently advanced two primary theories to explain its brevity. The
first argument is that the drafters intended to create an entirely new federal system, and
Congressional statute, not the Constitution, was the appropriate forum for the details to be
fleshed out. This argument is based on the fact that under the Confederation, the states
possessed the sole authority to create bankruptcy laws. See ARTICLES OF THE CONFEDERATION

art. Il (reserving to the states all rights not expressly delegated to the United States). The
dissimilarity of the laws in the different states caused a multitude of problems. See 3 STORY,
supranote 21, §§ 1101-03. Many of these state laws were passed in part to relieve debtors from
imprisonment, a problem that had grown due to the consequences of the war and other
monetary disorders. Kurt Nadelmann, On the Origin of the Bankruptcy Clause, 1 AM. J. LEGAL
HIsT. 215, 223-24 (1957). Records of the Prison Discipline Society reflect that in 1830,
thousands of people had been imprisoned for debt, including "3,000 in Massachusetts, 10,000
in New York, 7,000 in Pennsylvania, and 3,000 in Maryland," and an estimated 50,000
additional people in the northern and middle states. Richard Ford, ImprisonmentforDebt,25
MICH. L. REV. 24,29 (1926).

The issue naturally arose as to whether a statute in one state could protect a debtor if he
ventured into another state. This question was often litigated in the years leading up to the
Constitutional Convention. See, e.g., James v. Allen, 1 Dall. 188, 191-92 (C.P. Phila. County
1786) (holding that an order protecting a debtor in New Jersey had no effect outside of that
state); Millar v. Hall, 1 DalI. 229, 231-33 (Pa. 1788) (Pennsylvania Supreme Court considered
the effectiveness of a Maryland statute granting debtor a discharge). James Madison discussed
the importance of a national bankruptcy code to prevent individuals from fleeing to other
states with impunity:
The power of establishing uniform laws of bankruptcy is so intimately connected
with the regulation of commerce, and will prevent so many frauds where the parties
or their property may lie or be removed into different States, that the expediency of
it seems not likely to be drawn into question.
The power of prescribing by general laws, the manner in which the public acts,
records and judicial proceedings of each State shall be proved, and the effect they
shall have in other States, is an evident and valuable improvement.... The power
here established may be rendered a very convenient instrument ofjustice, and be
particularly beneficial on the borders of contiguous States, where the effects liable
to justice may be suddenly and secretly translated in any stage of the process within
a foreigujurisdiction.
THE FEDERALIST No. 42, at 273 (James Madison) (Robert Scigliano ed., 2000).
An additional argument that a completely new law was intended stems from the fact that
the bankruptcy clause speaks of "uniform laws" rather than one "uniform law." James Monroe
Olmstead, Bankruptcy, A CommercialRegulation, 15 HARV L.REv. 829, 831 (1902). This leads to
the inference that Congress was free to create different laws for different types of debtors. Id.
The second argument is that the American system of bankruptcy was adopted with the
English system in mind; therefore, the drafters just assumed that the United States system
would mirror that of England. Id. This argument is based on the fact that the principal
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For most of the nineteenth century, there was no federal
bankruptcy law. The Bankruptcy Act of 1800 was repealed in 1803;23
the Bankruptcy Act of 184124 survived an even shorter time. In 1867,

Congress passed a bankruptcy statute which lasted until 1 8 7 8 .25
Each of these laws was passed in response to a particular economic
crisis. 2 6 Finally, in 1898, Congress passed a lasting, comprehensive

bankruptcy statute, the Bankruptcy Act of 1898.7 The current
Bankruptcy28Code, enacted in 1978, subsequently supplanted this
enactment.

Bankruptcy law is provided by federal statute in the United
States. Unlike Australian law, the provisions for both personal
bankruptcy and corporate insolvency are codified together. Their
provisions are found overwhelmingly in Title 11 of the United States
Code, known as the Bankruptcy Code (the "Code"). Under the
Code, there are two primary forms of proceedings. In the first, a
debtor, either individual or corporate, liquidates its assets and the
resulting proceeds are distributed to creditors.
This type of
proceeding typically occurs under chapter 7 of the Code. 29 In the
other, a debtor attempts to "reorganize" under either chapter 11,
12, or 13 of the Code. ° In a reorganization, the goal is to confirm a
sponsors of the clause were both trained in the English system. Id. Therefore, the argument
goes, the framer's intent was to limit congressional power over bankruptcy legislation to law
"analogous to the English bankruptcy laws in force at the end of the eighteenth century."
Williston, supra note 9, at 551. The English system at that time was confined to traders and
provided only for involuntary bankruptcies. Id.
Act of Apr. 4, 1800, ch. 19, 2 Stat. 19, repealed by Act of Dec. 19, 1803, ch. 6, 2 Stat.
248.
Act of Aug. 19, 1841, ch. 9, 5 Stat. 440, repealed by Act of Mar. 3, 1843, ch. 82, 5 Stat.
614.
Act of Mar. 2, 1867, c. 176, 14 Stat. 517, repealed by Act ofJune 7, 1878, c. 160, 20
Stat. 99.
The Depression of 1793 brought about the Bankruptcy Act of 1800. The panics of
1837 and 1857 brought about the Acts of 1841 and 1867, respectively. The first two statutes
were intended to be only temporary measures. See David A. Skeel,Jr., The Genius of the 1898
Bankruptcy Ac4 15 BANKR. DEv.J. 321, 323 (1999). For a full discussion, see WARREN, supra
note 21.
' Act ofJuly 1, 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544, repealed by Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978,
Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549. The Act provided for, inter alia, both voluntary and
involuntary proceedings and allowed state exemption laws based on domicile to be in effect.
It also required debtor cooperation for discharge and identified certain debts as
nondischargeable.
See Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549.
Seell U.S.C. §§ 701-66 (2000).
Chapter 11 deals primarily with reorganization of corporate entities. See 11 U.S.C.
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plan providing for various payment streams to prepetition creditors
in return for a discharge of outstanding prepetition debt. An
individual debtor generally chooses between filing under chapter 7
and chapter 13.3' The remainder of the Code, chapters 1, 3, and 5,
contain general provisions broadly applicable to all forms of
bankruptcy.
A.

The Chapter 7 Approach

Chapter 7 has historically provided debtors a simple and
potentially inexpensive method of obtaining a bankruptcy
discharge
Its core feature is that it allows debtors to obtain a
discharge of all prepetition bankruptcy debts without incurring
future debt payment obligations.33 The only financial obligation
imposed on the debtor is that she relinquish all nonexempt assets
owned at the time of bankruptcy for distribution to creditors.Y The
most common assets fully or partially exempted by law that a
chapter 7 debtor may retain are family residences, household
furnishings, clothing, personal effects of the debtor and his family,
the family car, and life insurance. 35 The vast majority of bankruptcy
§§

1101-74 (2000). Chapter 12 pertains to family farmer debt adjustment. See id. §§ 1201-32.
Chapter 13 applies to individual debt adjustment. See id. §§ 1301-30.
" It is possible for an individual to file under chapter 11 as well. See Toibb v. Radloff,
501 U.S. 157, 166 (1991).
As noted, liquidating corporations may also use chapter 7.
" See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 727(b) ("Except as provided in section 523 of this title, a
discharge under subsection (a) of this section discharges the debtor from all debts that arose
before the date of the order for relief under this chapter....").
See, e.g., id. §§ 541(a), 726.
See id. § 522. Exemptions under United States bankruptcy law are an anomaly in that
they are a nonuniform component of an otherwise uniform system. Before the enactment of
the current Bankruptcy Code in 1978, bankruptcy law followed state and nonbankruptcy
federal law on exemptions. This resulted in a problem of nonuniformity of state law
exemptions because of the great variance in the dollar amounts of certain exemptions allowed
by different states in the same property.
In enacting the 1978 Code, a compromise was reached between those who favored a
single, exclusive, uniform set of exemptions and those who favored individual state
exemptions that could provide for regional differences in the cost of living. Section 522(b) of
the Code gives a bankrupt the choice between a set of exemptions contained in the
Bankruptcy Code and the exemptions that would otherwise be available under
nonbankruptcy law. 11 U.S.C. § 522(b). The anomaly is that unlike the rest of the Code,
pursuant to § 522(b) (1) of the Code, individual states may opt out of this provision and
demand that their own set of exemptions be employed.
This choice between the federal exemptions and state exemptions can be meaningful, as
there is a wide range of exempt property under state law. For example, the Code allows for a
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cases in the United States are filed under chapter 7,36 and many have
voiced concern over chapter 7 being employed as a vehicle for
debtor abuse. 7 For example, a debtor with a high future income
and limited nonexempt assets may obtain a chapter 7 discharge
without devoting any available future income to repaying creditors.
Chapter 7 cases may be voluntary or involuntary.3' The filing of
an involuntary petition has much the same effect as filing a
voluntary petition s 9 An estate is created just as under voluntary

homestead exemption of only $17,425, whereas the homestead exemption allowed by states
varies greatly. 11 U.S.C. § 522(d) (1). Some states allow no homestead exemption. See, e.g.,
DEL. CODE. ANN. TIT. 10 §§ 49014903, 4914 (2001); NJ. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:17-17 to 17-19
(West 2000). Other states allow the entire value of the home to be exempted and beyond the
reach of creditors, irrespective of the home's value. See FLA. CONST. art. X, § 4 (2001); IOWA.
CODE §§ 561.1, -.2, -.16, (2002); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-2301 (2001); TEx. CONsT. art. XVI,
§§ 50-51 (2002).
State law exemptions typically take one of three forms. A debtor is allowed to exempt
either (1) a certain dollar amount of property of whatever kind he or she chooses; (2) certain
types of property, irrespective of their value; or (3) certain types of property, but only up to
certain dollar amounts. The most common state law exemptions are similar to those under
the Code (family residences, household furnishings, clothing and personal effects, the family
car, insurance, and certain qualified retirement accounts). The effect of exempting property
is specified in § 522(c). Once property is exempt, essentially only three types of creditors may
access the property, (1) certain tax claimants, (2) creditors with claims for child support or
support of a former spouse, and (3) creditors with a lien on the property in question.
However, in this last case, the lien can be avoided if certain requirements are met. See 11
U.S.C. § 522(f) (1) (B).
For example, during the twelve-month period ending September 30, 2001, just over
one million cases filed were filed under chapter 7, 412,272 were filed under chapter 13,
10,519 were filed under chapter 11, and 379 were filed under chapter 12. American
Bankruptcy Institute, U.S. Bankruptcy Filing Statistics (2001), at http://abiworld.org/stats/
newstatsfront.html. See also 38 BANKRuPTcYCOuRT DECISIONs, No. 18 (Dec. 18, 2001).
17
This concern has been one of the forces behind the ongoing attempt to achieve
bankruptcy reform in the United States. For a fuller discussion of the issue of bankruptcy
reform, see infra note 53 and accompanying text.
See 11 U.S.C. §§ 301, 303.
There are several requirements that must be met to place a debtor in bankruptcy
involuntarily. First, as a general matter, there must be three or more petitioning creditors,
each of whom holds a claim that is neither contingent as to liability nor subject to a bona fide
dispute, and who together hold total claims of at least $10,775. 11 U.S.C. § 303(b) (1). The
rationale for the three creditor requirement is that it prevents creditors from harassing an
honest debtor, for example, by attempts to force the debtor into making preferential
payments by threatening an involuntary proceeding. However, if there are fewer than twelve
claimants, a single creditor can put an entity into bankruptcy. Id. § 303(b) (2).
If the petition is contested, an order for relief will still be granted if the debtor is
generally not paying his debts as they become due. See id. § 303(h)(1). This means for
involuntary bankruptcy, unlike for voluntary bankruptcy, there is something akin to an
insolvency requirement.
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41
and the automatic stay immediately goes into effect.

As a general matter, an involuntary case can be filed against any
debtor, though there are a few exceptions.
The mechanics of a chapter 7 case are straightforward. In all
chapter 7 cases, a trustee is appointed promptly after the
bankruptcy petition is filed. 4' The trustee's duties, set forth in § 704
of the Code, are geared to the compilation and distribution of the
debtor's estate.44 The debtor's nonexempt assets are liquidated, and
the property of the estate is distributed to creditors according to
priority as determined by statute.45
A successful chapter 7 debtor obtains a discharge.46 The
discharge extinguishes the debtor's personal liability on claims.47

' See 11 U.S.C. § 541(a). Section 541(a) (1) states that the estate is comprised of "all
legal or equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the commencement of the case." In
the case of divided property interests, this definition only encompasses the debtor's interest in
the property. SeeBoard of Trade of Chicago v.Johnson, 264 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1924). Exceptions
to what becomes property of the estate are listed in § 541 (b). In the case of a chapter 7 filing,
§ 541 draws a distinction between existing assets and future wages. The idea is for an
individual who files chapter 7 to get a "fresh start" by preserving all assets acquired
postpetition. For chapter 13 cases, the definition of property of the estate is broadened to
include postpetition wages. See 11 U.S.C. § 1306(a) (2).
4 11 U.S.C. § 362(a). Filing a bankruptcy petition operates as a stay against a wide
variety of actions.
See id. § 303(a). However, creditors can only place a debtor involuntarily into
chapters 7 and 11, so, for example, municipalities and family farmers are exempt. In addition,
an individual cannot be placed involuntarily into chapter 13. This is because chapter 13
requires payment out of future income, and forcing a debtor into chapter 13 involuntarily
would too closely resemble involuntary servitude, which violates the Thirteenth Amendment.
See, e.g., Toibb v. Radloff, 501 U.S. 157, 165-66 (1991).
" 11 U.S.C. § 701. An interim trustee is initially appointed; at the § 341 meeting of
creditors, either another individual is elected trustee or the status of the interim trustee is
changed to permanent. Id. § 702.
"' The trustee's duties include, without limitation, (1) collecting and liquidating all
property of the estate and closing the estate as expeditiously as is consistent with the best
interests of the various parties, (2) being accountable for all property so received, (3)
investigating the debtor's financial affairs, (4) examining and objecting to the allowance of
improper proofs of claim, (5) when advisable, opposing the debtor's discharge, (6) filing
required reports, providing required information, and 7) distributing the liquidated assets of
the estate to the creditors in accordance with their priorities and claims. Id. § 704.
'
See i& § 726.
', See id § 727. Section 727(a) states the general rule that the court shall grant the
debtor a discharge, and provides a number of exceptions to the general rule. Section 727(b)
provides that effect of the discharge is to discharge the debtor from all debts that arose before
bankruptcy. See also id. § 524.
41 See id. § 524(a) (2) (discharge operates against an "act to collect, recover,
or offset any
such debt as a personal liability of the debtor").
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The Code provides that the discharge serves as an injunction against
collection acts against the debtor or his property in connection with
claims that arose prior to the bankruptcy filing.48 The injunction is
permanent, and it effectively replaces the automatic stay. Creditors
violating the injunction can be sanctioned. 4 The impact of the
discharge is to give the honest and cooperative debtor a financial
"fresh start." By doing so, it serves to motivate debtors to
energetically seek financially productive economic roles. By making
a debtor again financially viable, it thus provides him or her an
incentive to work and become a productive member of society. To
the extent that a discharge may be denied for debtor misconduct,50
it motivates debtors to cooperate with the bankruptcy procedure.
A debtor who employs chapter 7 may face certain obstacles to
obtaining discharge. Section 707(a) of the Code allows a filing to
be dismissed "for cause," although precisely what constitutes cause is
not fully articulated in the statute."' In addition, in a much debated
clause, § 707(b) states that a court may dismiss a case of an
individual with consumer debts if it finds that granting relief would
be a substantial abuse of chapter 7. Again, the meaning of
"substantial abuse" is left open by the Code. There are a few
reported decisions where a court has held that a debtor capable of
repaying some debt who files under chapter 7 rather than chapter
13 is subject to this provision. 2 The question of whether § 707(b)
See id.
See e.g., In re Nat'l Gypsum Co., 118 F.3d 1056, 1063 (5th Cir. 1997); Whitaker v.
Lockert (In reWhitaker), 16 B.R. 917, 923 (M.D. Tenn. 1982).
See, e.g., II U.S.C. §§ 523, 727(a) (grounds for denying discharge of individual debts
and for denying discharge in the entirety, respectively).
"' Seeid.§707(a).
12
See, e.g., In re Stewart, 175 F. 3d 796, 808 (10th Cir. 1999) (ability to repay a primary
factor in totality of circumstances approach); Lamanna v. Lamanna (In re Lamanna), 153 F.
3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 1998) (ability to repay may alone constitute substantial abuse); Green v.
Staples (In re Green), 934 F. 2d 568, 572 (4th Cir. 1991) (Five factors "as well as the relation of
the debtor's future income to his future necessary expenses" are relevant to substantial
abuse.); Stuart v. Koch (In reKoch), 109 F. 3d 1285, 1288 (8th Cir. 1989) ("[T]he substantial
abuse inquiry focuses primarily on Debtor's ability to pay; indeed, substantial ability to pay
creditors standing alone warrants dismissal of a Chapter 7 petition for substantial abuse.");
Kelly III v. Kelly III (In re Kelly), 841 F.2d 908, 914 (9th Cir. 1988) (noting primary factor in
substantial abuse determination is "the debtor's ability to repay the debts for which a
discharge is sought").
There has been much academic debate as to why an individual who conceivably could
pay off some or all of his or her debts if given time should be allowed to discharge all
prepetition debts. See, e.g., THOMAS H.JACKSON, THE LoGic AND LIMIrS OF BANKRUPrcYLAw
225-52 (Harvard Press 1986) (discharge a necessary corrective for both human impulsiveness
"
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should be uniformly employed when a debtor has significant
income and can repay part of his or her debt from such
income is at
53
the heart of the American bankruptcy reform debate.
and systematic underestimation of risks involved in credit); KAREN GROSS, FAILURE AND
FORGIVENESS: REBALANCING THE BANKRuPTcY SYSTEM 91-103 (1997) (rehabilitation and
forgiveness justify bankruptcy discharge); CHARLESJORDAN TABB, THE LAW OF BANKRuPTCY 68
(1997) (discharge necessary to encourage debtor participation in processes of liquidation and
distribution of assets). But see generally Theodore Eisenberg, Bankrupty Law in Perspective,28
UCLA L. REV. 953 (1981) (debtor best monitor of risk of default and thus should not be
afforded broad discharge).
Bankruptcy reform has been under discussion for several years in the United States.
Prior to the events of September 11, 2001, which caused Congress to place bankruptcy reform
on the back burner, it appeared likely to finally be consummated in 2001. As of this writing, it
is unclear when Congress will resume full efforts to address the issues of reform.
Both the House and the Senate passed versions of bankruptcy reform in 2001. See H.R.
333, 107th Cong. (2001); S. 420 107th Cong. (2001). The two bills are largely consistent.
They address the following major areas that impact personal bankruptcy:
(A) Both bills would employ a method of means testing. In each instance,
§ 707(b) of the Code would be amended to provide for dismissal of chapter 7 cases
upon a finding of abuse, or with the debtor's consent, conversion to chapter 13. See
H.R. 333 § 102, S.420 § 102.
Abuse could be shown in one of two ways. First, a presumption of abuse may
be invoked based on a means test. Any party in interest, including the U.S. trustee
or bankruptcy administrator, or ajudge, could assert that the presumption applies,
but only as to debtors whose income exceeds a defined state median. The means
test is designed to determine the extent of a debtor's ability to repay general
unsecured claims and has the three following elements: (1) a definition of "current
monthly income," measuring the total income a debtor is presumed to have
available; (2) a list of allowed deductions from current monthly income for
purposes of support and repayment of higher priority debt; and (3) defined
"trigger points" at which the income remaining after the allowed deductions would
result in the presumption of abuse.
The allowed monthly deductions from income vary slightly between the bills.
However, the primary deductions are the same. They include (a) set allowances for
food, clothing, personal care, transportation, housing and entertainment, as
established by the Internal Revenue Service for negotiating the repayment of
delinquent tax obligations (the "National and Local Collection Standards"), except
that any portion of these allowances reflecting repayment of debt is not to be
counted; (b) actual expenses of the debtor in categories recognized by the IRS but
as to which no specific allowance has been set (the "Other Necessary Expense
Standard"); (c) 1/60 of all secured debt due in the five years following the
bankruptcy filing and of all past due debt secured by property necessary for
support; (d) 1/60 of all priority debt; and (e) as under current law, charitable
contributions of up to fifteen percent of gross income.
There are two distinct trigger points: (1) if the debtor has at least $166.67 in
monthly income available after the allowed deductions, abuse is presumed
regardless of the amount of the debtor's general unsecured debt, and (2) if the
debtor has at least $100 of such income, abuse is presumed if the income is
sufficient to pay at least twenty-five percent of the debtor's general unsecured debt
over five years. Thus, a debtor with $100 in monthly income after allowed
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deductions would be subject to a presumption of abuse if the debtor had general
unsecured debt of $24,000 or less; a debtor with $150 in monthly income after
deductions would be subject to the presumption with general unsecured debt of
$36,000 or less; and a debtor with income of $200 after deductions would be subject
to the presumption regardless of how much unsecured debt was owed.
To rebut the presumption, a debtor would have to prove exigent
circumstances that would decrease income or increase expenses so as to bring the
debtor's income after expenses below the trigger points.
The second basis for a finding of abuse, applicable where the presumption
does not exist or has been rebutted, is that the debtor filed the petition in bad faith
or that the totality of the debtor's financial circumstances indicates abuse. The U.S.
trustee, bankruptcy administrator, or judge can assert this basis for finding abuse in
any case; creditors are limited to asserting it in cases where the debtor's income is
above the defined state median.
(B) Both bills impact priority distributions. In each bill, family support
obligations of the debtor would have first priority in distribution, ahead of the costs
of administering the estate. See H.R. 333 § 212, S.420 § 212.
(C) Successive filings would be affected. See H.R. 333 § 312, S.420 § 312.
Under both bills, a chapter 7 debtor would be subject to denial of discharge under
§ 727 if the debtor received a chapter 7 or 11 discharge in a case filed within eight
years of the filing of the pending case.
The treatment of chapter 13 debtors varies between the two bills. Under H.R.
333 § 312, chapter 13 debtors would be denied discharge if their case was filed
within five years of the filing of any other bankruptcy case in which the debtor
received a discharge. Under S. 420 § 312, there would be a denial of discharge if a
chapter 13 debtor received (a) a discharge in a case under chapter 7, 11, or 12,
filed within three years of the pending case filing (without exception), or (b) a
discharge in a prior chapter 13 case filed within two years of the pending case filing
(subject to an exception of extreme hardship).
(D) Debtor education would be introduced. Under both bills, individuals
would be ineligible for relief under any chapter of the Code unless they had
received credit counseling within 180 days of their bankruptcy filing. See H.R. 333
§ 106, S.420 § 106. The counseling must be through a service approved by the
United States trustee or bankruptcy administrator and must include, at least, a
briefing on the opportunities for credit counseling and assistance in performing an
initial budget analysis. Exceptions would be made (1) for districts in which
adequate services were unavailable, and (2) for debtors with exigent circumstances
requiring filing before the counseling could be obtained-within five days after the
debtor requested it-in which case the debtor would be required to complete the
counseling within thirty days after the bankruptcy filing.
In addition, pilot educational programs for debtor financial management
would be tested in six judicial districts over an eighteen-month period, and
thereafter evaluated for effectiveness and cost. See H.R. 333 § 105, S.420 § 105. At
the same time, all chapter 7 debtors would be subject to denial of discharge under
§ 727, and chapter 13 debtors would not be granted a discharge if they failed to
complete an instructional course concerning personal debt management (unless
the United States trustee or bankruptcy administrator determined that approved
courses were inadequate). See H.R. 333 § 106, S.420 § 106.
(E) The extent of the automatic stay could be impacted. Under both bills, if
a chapter 7, 11, or 13 case is filed within one year of the dismissal of an earlier case
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Under certain circumstances, a debtor may be denied a
discharge, either in the entirety or for certain individual debts.
Denial of discharge in its entirety is warranted when the debtor has
engaged in conduct that could potentially undermine the integrity
of the bankruptcy process, such as fraud or destroying or
withholding pertinent information. 4
Even when a discharge is obtained, individual debts may be
nondischargeable. The Code establishes a list of eighteen types of
debts that may be excepted from discharge."' These include debts
owed creditors who never received proper notice of the bankruptcy,
obligations arising from alimony or child support obligations, claims
resulting from willful and malicious injury, certain educational
loans, and claims resulting from a debt incurred under false
pretenses.
A chapter 7 discharge has a broad but not an unlimited effect.
The discharge serves to protect a debtor from personal liability on
claims incurred before the filing of the bankruptcy petition, and it
operates as an injunction against the pursuit of such claims. The
discharge does not in and of itself avoid any valid lien on property
that secures payment of a debt.56 That is, a lien, unless otherwise

(other than a chapter 11 or 13 case filed after a § 707(b) dismissal), the automatic
stay in the second case terminates thirty days after the filing, unless a party in
interest demonstrates that the second case was filed in good faith with respect to
the creditor sought to be stayed. If a second repeat filing takes place within the oneyear period, the automatic stay does not go into effect, although a party in interest
may obtain imposition of the stay by demonstrating that the third filing is in good
faith with respect to the creditor sought to be stayed. See H.R. 333 § 302, S.420

§ 302.
(F) Exemption law would be impacted. Under both bills, a debtors must
have had a domicile for 730 days before filing in order to claim the exemption law
of their place of domicile. Otherwise, the applicable exemption law is that of the
place of domicile for the majority of the 180-day period preceding the 730 days
before filing. SeeH.R. 333 § 307, S.420 § 307.
The two bills differ on homestead exemptions. H.R. 333 § 308 provides for
an exclusion from the exemption of any value added by the debtor to the
homestead, with intent to hinder or delay creditors, during the seven years prior to
the bankruptcy filing. S. 420 § 308 places a $125,000 cap on all homestead
exemptions.
' See 11 U.S.C. § 727(a) (2000). The justification for denying discharge in these
circumstances is that bankruptcy is an equitable forum, and those with unclean hands should
not be able to avail themselves of such equitable relief.
"' Seeid.§523.
Liens pass through bankruptcy. SeeLongv. Bullard, 117 U.S. 617, 619 (1886).
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avoided in bankruptcy, 57 passes through bankruptcy and can be
enforced against the property. Thus, the debt is not actually

17
The most common methods of lien avoidance in bankruptcy are the preference and
fraudulent transfer provisions and the trustee's so-called "strong arm" power, which allows for
the avoidance of attached but unperfected liens.
A transfer is presumptively preferential if it is made to or for the benefit of a creditor, on
account of an antecedent debt, while the debtor was insolvent, during the relevant preference
period, provided the transfer leaves the creditor better off than if the transfer had not been
made. 11 U.S.C. § 547. If a transfer is preferential, the trustee can avoid it and return the
transferred asset to the bankruptcy estate. The ability to avoid the transfer is linked to § 550,
which governs liability of the transferee. See id. § 550. Under § 550, a trustee can recover the
amount of a preferential transfer from either the initial transferee or from the party for whose
benefit the transfer was made. If the transfer was in cash, the amount recovered becomes
property of the estate. See, e.g., id. § 541 (a) (1). If the preference was the creation of a lien,
the lien will be nullified, which will have the effect of increasing the value of the estate for the
other unsecured creditors, since more unencumbered assets will exist and be available for the
unsecured creditors. The result is that time is effectively turned back, and the parties are
placed in the positions they were in before bankruptcy was on the horizon.
Not all payments that meet the § 547(b) requirements are avoidable preferences.
Section 547 is designed primarily to promote the pro rata treatment of unsecured creditors
and to discourage prebankruptcy creditor collection efforts that would force an individual or
a company prematurely into bankruptcy. But financially troubled individuals and companies
need to be able to pay their bills to continue to operate and to obtain credit. As a result, the
Code sets out a number of exceptions for transfers that meet the requirements of § 547(b)
but are not preferential. Perhaps the most significant of these is the ordinary course of
business exception found in § 547(c).
The Code provides two possibilities for a trustee avoiding fraudulent conveyances. The
primary fraudulent conveyance section is § 548; in addition, the trustee can also employ state
fraudulent conveyance law by invoking § 544(b). The principal rationale for employing the
latter rather than the former is one of timing. Section 548 allows avoidance of fraudulent
conveyance laws only for the prior year. Most state statutes have significantly longer statutes
of limitations. Whether under state or bankruptcy law, conveyances made by an insolvent
debtor or by a debtor who is thereby rendered insolvent for less than fair consideration are
fraudulent irrespective of intent; those made with actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud
creditors are also fraudulent. 11 U.S.C. § 548; Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act §§ 4, 7.
The strong arm power of the trustee under § 544(a) gives the trustee the power of
certain hypothetical creditors to avoid various liens. The purpose of this provision is to
provide a bankruptcy equivalent to certain state law rights. Outside of bankruptcy, general
creditors sometimes have greater rights than do secured creditors. The most obvious example
is a creditor with an unperfected but attached security interest against the debtor. The debtor
has no rights against the unperfected creditor in the event of a default. However, a general
creditor could reduce its claim to judgment, levy on the collateral in question, and take
priority over the unperfected secured creditor. To ensure that creditors can look to the same
assets inside bankruptcy that they can look to outside of bankruptcy, § 544(a) gives the trustee
the right not only to what the debtor owns, but also to that which the general creditors could
have reached under nonbankruptcy law. Another use of the strong arm power is the
avoidance of unrecorded mortgages on real property.
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discharged; only the debtor's personal liability for the debt is
discharged.'
There are a number of ways in which the chapter 7 discharge is
protected. First, the discharge serves as an injunction preventing
collection acts against the debtor in connection with claims that
arose prior to the bankruptcy filing.5 Any creditor who violates the
injunction can be sanctioned.
Second, certain forms of
governmental and private discrimination based "solely" on the fact
that a person had been a debtor in bankruptcy or had failed to
repay debts discharged in bankruptcy are forbidden. 6° Third, while
the Code does allow a debtor involved in a bankruptcy proceeding
to "reaffirm" a debt and become legally bound to repay a debt that
would otherwise have been discharged, any reaffirmation agreement
must comply with detailed requirements intended to ensure that the
reaffirmation agreement is not inconsistent with the debtor's best
interests.6
The Code allows a chapter 7 debtor to redeem property under
certain circumstances.62 To redeem property secured by a lien, the
debtor must pay the full amount of the allowed secured claim.'
The effect is that redemption is allowable if the other statutory
requirements are met by the paying of either the debt or the value
of the collateral, whichever is less.
One final element worth noting is that the Code places certain
limitations on repeat bankruptcy filings for chapter 7 debtors.
There are three express prohibitions. First, § 109(g) prohibits
repeat filings within 180 days of a dismissal of a prior bankruptcy

" Discharge affects only the personal liability of the debtor. Seell U.S.C. § 524(a) (1).
Id.
Id. § 525. For a fuller discussion of bankruptcy discrimination, see Douglass G.
Boshkoff, Bankruptcy-Based Discrimination, 66 AM. BANKR. LJ. 387 (1992); Douglass G.
Boshkoff, Private Parties and Bankruptci-BasedDiscrimination,62 IND. L.J. 159 (1986);John C.
Chobot, Anti-DiscriminationUnder the Bankruptcy Laws, 60 AM. BANKR. LJ. 185 (1986).
6' See 11 U.S.C. § 524(c). Under this section, a debtor may become legally bound to pay
a prebankruptcy debt notwithstanding the discharge. Both secured and unsecured debts may
be reaffirmed. The Code provides a number of safeguards to ensure that reaffirmation is in
the debtor's best interest, including that the reaffirmation promise must be in writing, the
promise must contain a clear and conspicuous statement advising the debtor of his right to
rescind for sixty days, the agreement needs to be accompanied by an attorney affidavit when it
is filed in court, and if the debtor files pro se, the bankruptcy judge must approve the
reaffirmation agreement. Id. § 524(c)-(d).
See id. § 722.
63Id.
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case for failure to abide by court orders or to properly appear, or if
the dismissal was voluntary following a request for relief from the
automatic stay.6 Second, the Code prohibits the filing of a chapter
7 petition within six years of a prior chapter 7.6 Finally, the Code
prohibits the filing of a chapter 7 petition within six years of the
filing of a chapter 12 or a chapter 13 petition. 66
B.

The Chapter 13 Approach

In contrast to a chapter 7 liquidation, chapter 13 affords a
qualified individual debtor6 7 the opportunity to reorganize his or
her financial affairs and repay a portion of his or her indebtedness
from future earnings over a three-year period pursuant to a court
approved plan.6 Unlike a chapter 7 debtor, a debtor in chapter 13
is not required to relinquish any nonexempt assets.69
Chapter 13 cases also move expeditiously. A debtor in a
chapter 13 case must file a plan of reorganization within fifteen days
of filing the bankruptcy petition, unless an extension of time is

Id. § 109(g).

67

Id. § 727(a) (8). This limitation also applies to a chapter 11 petition.
Id. §727(a) (9).
The primary requirements for being a debtor under chapter 13 are set out in 11

U.S.C. § 109(e). Section 109(e) provides that a chapter 13 bankruptcy petition may be filed
only by (1) an individual (2) with regular income (3) who owes, on the date of the filing of
the petition, noncontingent, liquidated, unsecured debt less than $269,250, and
noncontingent, liquidated, secured debt less than $807,750.
0 This of course requires a broader definition of property of the estate than that
included in § 541. Accordingly, § 1306 defines property of the estate for chapter 13 cases to
include, in addition to all property covered by § 541 (a), after-acquired property obtained up
until such time as the case is closed, dismissed or converted. 11 U.S.C. § 1306.
0 Under current law, individuals tend to opt for chapter 13 over chapter 7 for a number
of reasons, including: (1) the debtor possesses substantial nonexempt property which would
be liquidated under chapter 7 for distribution to creditors (This rationale is particularly
pertinent when applicable exemption law places dollar limits on the value of the exemption
of the home.); (2) the debtor seeks to discharge debts which are not dischargeable under
chapter 7 but which may be discharged under chapter 13 (Of the eighteen categories of
nondischargeable claims in chapter 7, only three-alimony and child support obligations,
certain educational loans, and claims arising from death or personal injury caused while
operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated-may not be discharged in chapter 13. 11 U.S.C.
§ 1328(a) (2)); (3) the debtor may believe that chapter 13 involves less stigmatization or may
have a lesser impact on the debtor's credit rating; or (4) chapter 7 discharge may be
unavailable to the debtor. For example, a debtor may obtain a chapter 7 discharge only once
every six years, while there is no limit on the frequency of obtaining discharge under chapter
13. Id. § 727(a)(8).
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granted. 70
In addition, the debtor must commence making
payments to the Trustee within thirty days after the plan is filed,
even though the plan is not yet confirmed.71 Within twenty to fifty
days of the filing of the petition, the United States Trustee must call
a meeting of creditors pursuant to § 341,72 and proofs of claim are
due within ninety days thereafter.73 Unlike with chapter 7, discharge
is not obtained in chapter 13 until all payments have been made
pursuant to the plan. Chapter 13 plans typically run three years, but
they can be extended to as long as five years with court approval. 74
There are three mandatory provisions for a chapter 13 plan 75 and six
requirements for plan confirmation.76
The plan is funded by submitting "future earnings or other
future income of the debtor to the supervision and control of the
trustee as is necessary for the execution of the plan."77 In the event
that a trustee or unsecured creditor objects to confirmation, the
plan must conform with the projected disposable income
requirement. In essence, this requirement mandates that the plan
provide for the debtor's entire projected disposable income for a
three-year period to be applied to payments under the plan. 78 The
projected disposable income calculation requires a projection of
how much the debtor will earn over the period of the three-year
plan and a deduction from that amount of expenses that are
70 FED. R. BANKR. P. 3015(b) (2000).
" 11 U.S.C. § 1326(a).
72 FED. P. BANKR. P. 2003(a).
Id. 3002(c).
7, 11 U.S.C. § 1322(d).
The mandatory contents are (1) the plan must provide for the submission of a
sufficient portion of the debtor's future income and earnings to the supervision and control
of the trustee to fund the plan; (2) the plan must provide for the full payment, in deferred
cash payments, of all priority claims, unless the holder of such a claim agrees to different
treatment; and (3) if the plan classifies claims, the plan must provide equal treatment of all
claims in each class. Id. § 1322(a).
" The six confirmation requirements are (1) the plan must comply with applicable
provisions of the Code; (2) all required fees must be paid; (3) the plan must be proposed in
good faith; (4) unsecured creditors must receive at least what they would have received in a
chapter 7 liquidation; (5) secured creditors must be afforded one of three options (First if the
creditor has accepted the plan, that creditor's treatment is determined contractually by the
plan. Second, the plan may allow the secured creditor to retain its lien and receive value, as
of the effective date of the plan, at least equal to the allowed amount of the secured claim.
The third possibility is for the debtor to surrender the collateral to the creditor.); and (6) the
debtor must be able to make all payments under the plan. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a).
Id.§1322(a)(1).
' Seeid.§ 1325(b)(1)(B).
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reasonably necessary for support of the debtor and his dependants.79
The remaining amount must be used to fund the plan. There is an
additional factor for unsecured creditors-they must receive at least
what they would be paid in a chapter 7 liquidation."
Secured claims are given treatment in chapter 13, which
provides incentives for debtors to look to that chapter as a method
of curing defaults on secured loans and retaining encumbered
property. Most secured loans contain acceleration clauses stating
that in the event of a default the entire balance is immediately due
and payable. The effect of acceleration clauses is to make the
prospect of curing a default an impossibility for most people.
Chapter 13 provides two methods by which a debtor may deal with
an accelerated secured loan. The first is modification. The second
is reinstatement and cure.
Modification constitutes a legally imposed alteration to the
terms of the loan.8' There are three alternative ways in which the
holder of a secured claim can be bound by a modification.82 The
first is if the creditor accepts the plan. The second is if the debtor
surrenders the collateral to the creditor. The third is if the plan
provides for repayment of an amount, as of the effective date of the
plan, that at least equals the amount of the allowed secured claim.8
Under American law, the amount of the secured claim cannot
exceed the value of the collateral.84 If the collateral is worth less
than the outstanding debt, payment is based on the collateral value,
not the debt value. This is sometimes referred to as the "cram
down" effect of chapter

13

.85

Modification is of tremendous use to people who own
encumbered property. 6 It allows the debtor to retain possession of
the collateral without the consent of the creditor, as long as the
Id.§ 1325(b) (2) (A).
Id. § 1325(a)(4). This is commonly known as the "best interests" rule. Even if the
§ 1325(b) analysis suggests that there is no extra money to pay off unsecured creditors,
§ 1325 (a) (4) still protects their interest up to the amount they would receive in a chapter 7.
Id.
S,
See id.§ 1322(b)(2).
See id.§ 1325(a) (5).
"
Id.
*' See id.§ 506(a).
See, e.g., Assocs. Commercial Corp. v. Rash, 520 U.S. 953,957 (1997).
6
Though it is worth noting that this is not the case in regard to one's primary
residence, as the Code prohibits modification of home mortgages. See 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b) (2);
Nobelman v. Am. Sav. Bank, 508 U.S. 324 (1993).
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debtor can pay off the amount of the secured claim plus interest
over the life of the plan." Accordingly, a chapter 13 debtor can do
what a chapter 7 debtor cannot-redeem the collateral by paying off
its value in installments.
The second principle method of treating secured claims in
chapter 13 is reinstatement and cure.' Unlike modification, this is a
return to the initial terms of the loan. The default is deemed cured,
and the loan is deemed reinstated. When this happens, the debtor
takes on two obligations. First, any obligation that is overdue must
be cured within a reasonable time; 9 and second, any obligation that
has not yet become due remains payable on the original due date.'
Reinstatement and cure tend to be used far more frequently in the
chapter 13 context than modification because, unlike modification,
reinstatement and cure may be used for personal residences. 9'
The Code contains only one express limitation on repeat
chapter 13 filings, and that is the § 109(g) prohibition against a
repeat filing within 180 days of the dismissal of a prior bankruptcy
case for failure to abide by court orders or to properly appear, or if
the dismissal was voluntary following a request for relief from the
automatic stay. The ability of a chapter 13 debtor to quickly repeat
as a bankrupt, where a chapter 7 debtor cannot, reflects the belief
that the chapter 13 debtor-who allegedly is making a fuller attempt
to repay his or her obligations than is a chapter 7 debtor-is entitled
to certain enhanced forms of relief.92
Seel U.S.C.§ 1322(b)(2).
Seeid§1322(b)(5).
What is reasonable depends on the facts and circumstances of the particular case. See
generally 8 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 1322.09 (5) (15th Rev. ed.).
"
Seel U.S.C. § 1322(b) (5).
" See 11 U.S.C. § 1322(c) (1).
Reinstatement and cure can be used for personal
residences up until the time of a foreclosure sale.
'
One area which has received much attention is the so-called "chapter 20" bankruptcy.
While the Code contains no chapter 20, these filings are so named because they consist of the
filing of a chapter 7 bankruptcy followed in close succession by the filing of a chapter 13.
Chapter 20 cases are typically employed in two situations. The first is a bankrupt who wishes
to circumvent the debt limitation for chapter 13 filings. To employ chapter 13, a bankrupt
must have no more than U.S. $269,250 in noncontingent, liquidated, unsecured debts and no
more than U.S. $807,750 in noncontingent, liquidated, secured debts. 11 U.S.C. § 109(e).
Some potential chapter 13 bankrupts who exceed these debt limitations, but are otherwise
eligible to employ chapter 13, first file a petition under chapter 7 solely to discharge some
(typically unsecured) debt in order to meet the chapter 13 debt limitation requirements.
Shortly after receiving a chapter 7 discharge, the bankrupt follows with a chapter 13 petition.
This is particularly enticing to a bankrupt who could not retain his or her home or car under
"'
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III. AUSTRALIAN BANKRUPTCY LAW-AN OVERVIEW
Bankruptcy Law in Australia is also federal.
The statute
governing Australian personal bankruptcy law is the Bankruptcy Act
of 1966. 94 Unlike in the United States, personal bankruptcy law is
codified separately from corporate bankruptcy law in Australiaf 5
chapter 7 but could do so under chapter 13 by reinstating and curing an accelerated secured
loan.
The second situation where chapter 20 cases are common is when a bankrupt has no
particular need for chapter 13 but for his or her inability to discharge certain debts under
chapter 7. As noted, chapter 13 provides for a broader discharge than does chapter 7, so a
bankrupt may file the chapter 13 shortly following the completion of the chapter 7 in order to
attempt to discharge in chapter 13 a debt that could not be discharged in chapter 7.
In 1991, the United States Supreme Court considered the question of whether a chapter
20 filing should be dismissed as bad faith in Johnson v. Home State Bank. 501 U.S. 78 (1991).
Writing for the CourtJustice Marshall stated:
Congress has expressly prohibited various forms of serial filings.... The absence of
a like prohibition on serial filings of chapter 7 and chapter 13 petitions, combined
with the evident care with which Congress fashioned these express prohibitions,
convinces us that Congress did not intend categorically to foreclose the benefit of
chapter 13 reorganization to a debtor who previously has filed for chapter 7 relief.
Id. at 87 (citing United States v. Smith, 499 U.S. 160, 167 (1991)). Thus, while use of a
chapter 20 case does not per se constitute bad faith warranting dismissal, see, e.g., Smyrnos v.
Padilla, (In re Padilla), 213 B.R. 349, 353-55 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1997), the use of a chapter 20 to
discharge a debt otherwise nondischargeable in chapter 7 is frequently the most significant
factor in the "totality of the circumstances" approach employed by courts to determine
whether a chapter 13 filing has in fact been made in good faith, as is required by 11 U.S.C.
§ 1325(a) (3). See, e.g., Davis v. Mather (In re Davis), 239 B.R. 573, 578-79 (B.A.P. 10th Cir.
1999).
An additional question which remains unresolved is the propriety of a bankrupt filing a
chapter 13 case after a discharge has been granted but before the formal closing of a
preceding chapter 7. While there is no express statutory bar against two bankruptcy cases
pending at the same time, courts have taken essentially three different views. One view is that
as long as the debtor meets all other eligibility requirements, the fact that a prior case
technically remains open is not a bar to filing. See, e.g., In re Hodurski, 156 B.R. 353, 356
(Bankr. D. Mass. 1993); In re Kosenka, 104 B.R. 40, 51 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1989). A second,
opposite approach is that such a filing is in bad faith and should be barred. See, e.g., Norwalk
Savings Society v. Peia (In rePeia), 204 B.R. 310, 314 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1996); In reHeywood,
39 B.R. 910, 911 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1984). The third view-something of a hybrid position-is
that since there is no express statutory prohibition against having two bankruptcy cases
simultaneously pending, the filing of a chapter 13 under these circumstances is not per se
impermissible, but rather is a factor to be considered should a creditor move for the case's
dismissal. However, in no instance may the two cases simultaneously pending seek to
discharge the same debt. Turner v. Citizens Nat'l Bank (In re Turner), 207 B.R. 373, 378-79
(B.A.P. 2d Cir. 1997).
" The Commonwealth is given power with respect to bankruptcy and insolvency by § 51
(xvii) of the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Australia.
" The first Commonwealth Bankruptcy Act was enacted in 1924. See Bankruptcy Act,
1924 (Austl.). The present law, the 1966 Act, underwent significant amendments in 1991 and
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In many ways, the Australian and American bankruptcy systems
mirror one another. 96 Each system allows both creditors and
debtors to commence a bankruptcy proceeding, and both require
some action on the part of the debtor to trigger the possibility of an
involuntary filing.97 Each system requires full debtor disclosure of
pertinent financial matters upon the debtor filing for bankruptcy
protection." Both systems provide for a moratorium period which,
with a few exceptions such as for alimony and child support,
prevents unsecured creditors from enforcing their rights against the
person or property of the bankrupt following the date of
bankruptcy.9
Each system divides debt obligations and the
1996. See Bankruptcy Amendment Act, 1991 (Austl.); Bankruptcy Legislation Amendment
Act, 1996 (Austil.). It has also recently been subject to additional amendment debate. See note
96 infra.
Company insolvency law is found within Australia's Corporations Act 2001 at Parts
5.3A-5.7B.
" This includes recent unsuccessful (as of this writing) attempts to reform the
bankruptcy laws. Proposed reforms in Australia were not passed by Parliament before the
Prime Minister called the November 10, 2001 elections. As a result the bills lapsed and will
have to be reconsidered by the incoming administration.
The reform bills contained a number of significant features, including the following.
First, a thirty-day "cooling off period" was proposed during which a debtor could withdraw a
bankruptcy petition. Second, Official Receivers would have been given discretion to reject
debtor's petitions if it appeared that the debtor could in fact pay all debts listed. Third, the
current potential for early discharge within six months would be abolished. Fourth, the
objections to discharge provisions would have been strengthened. Fifth, alternatives to
bankruptcy would be available to people with a higher income than is currently the case. For
a fuller discussion of the proposed reforms, see Don Costello, Bankruptcy Reforms Package, 11
NEW DIRECTIONS IN BANKR. 14 (Mar. 2001), available at http://v.law.gov.au/aghome/
commaff/itsa/framepubs.html.
7 Compare 11 U.S.C. § 303(h) (1) (2000) (general failure by the debtor to pay debts as
they become due is grounds for involuntary bankruptcy) with Bankruptcy Act, 1966, § 40
(Austl.) (listing acts of bankruptcy that can lead to a sequestration order against an Australian
bankrupt's estate).
Compare FED. R. BANKR. P. 1007(a) (1) (2000) ("In a voluntary case, the debtor shall
file with the petition a list containing the name and address of each creditor unless the
petition is accompanied by a schedule of liabilities.") with Bankruptcy Act, 1966, § 55(2)
(AustI.) ("A petition presented by a debtor under this section: (a) shall be in accordance with
the approved form; and (b) shall be accompanied by a statement of the debtor's affairs and a
copy of that statement.").
Compare11 U.S.C. § 362(a) with BankruptcyAct, 1966, § 58(3) (Austi.)
Except as provided by this Act, after a debtor has become a bankrupt, it is not
competent for a creditor:
(a) to enforce any remedy against the person or the property of the bankrupt
in respect of a provable debt; or
(b) except with the leave of the Court and on such terms as the Court thinks
fit, to commence any legal proceeding in respect of a provable debt or take
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bankruptcy estate into prebankruptcy and postbankruptcy filing
categories, though the definition of property of the estate in
Australia is comparable to the broader definition used in American
chapter 13 cases.i0° Both systems define those debts which may be
recovered in bankruptcy °' broadly to include future and contingent
liabilities, though in the United States, unlike Australia,
unliquidated rights to payment are also included.' 2 Each system
allows for preferential transfers to be voided and made available for
general distribution to creditors. 0 3 Finally, like chapter
13, the
4
typical period until discharge in Australia is three years. 1
The basic effect of bankruptcy in Australia is likewise very
similar to that in the United States-it vests the property the
bankrupt owns at the time of bankruptcy in the Official Trustee or
the registered trustee.' °s In addition, property acquired by the
bankrupt during the period of the bankruptcy vests in the Official
Trustee or the registered trustee immediately upon the property
being acquired by the debtor.' ° All property of the debtor must be
disclosed to the trustee. As in the United States, certain assets may
be protected, including necessary household goods, a vehicle up to

any fresh step in such a proceeding.").
Bankruptcy Act, 1966, § 58(3).
'w Compare 11 U.S.C. § 541(a) (1) (Property of the estate is comprised of "all legal or
equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the commencement of the case.") and 11
U.S.C. § 1306 (Property of the estate in chapter 13 cases includes all property "the debtor
acquires after the commencement of the case but before the case is closed, dismissed, or
converted.") with Bankruptcy Act, 1966, § 116(1) (a) (AustI.) (Property divisible among
creditors includes "all property that belonged to, or was vested in, a bankrupt at the
commencement of the bankruptcy, or has been acquired or is acquired by him or her, or has
devolved or devolves on him or her, after the commencement of the bankruptcy and before
his or her discharge.").
101 In the United States these are known as "claims." See 11 U.S.C. § 101(5). In Australia,
they are known as "provable debts." See Bankruptcy Act, 1966, § 82 (Austl.).
"' See 11 U.S.C.§ 101(5).
103 Compare 11 U.S.C. §§ 547, 548 with Bankruptcy Act, 1966, §§ 120-22 (AustI.).
N Compare 11 U.S.C. § 1322(d) with Bankruptcy Act, 1966, § 149(2) (Austi.). In
Australia, however, it is possible both to obtain an early discharge and to have the bankruptcy
period extended. Six months after the debtor files a statement of affairs with the Insolvency
and Trustee Service Australia, he can apply for an early discharge if thirteen conditions have
been met. In addition, the trustee can extend the bankruptcy period to either five or eight
years for certain reasons, such as failure to provide information, to assist the trustee, to
disclose income to the trustee or to pay contributions, failure to explain how money was spent
or to disclose assets or creditors.
10 Bankruptcy Act, 1966, § 58(1)(a) (Austl.).
, Id. §58(I) (b).
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a prescribed dollar amount, tools of trade up to a prescribed dollar
amount, personal injury compensation money, and normal
superannuation and life insurance. °7
There are, however, a number of critical differences between
the two countries' systems. In many ways, the Australian personal
bankruptcy system's critical features resonate back to the historical
English model of the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries,
when the concept of an act of bankruptcy was created. As a result,
there are a number of distinct differences between the American
and Australian systems.
To begin with, the structure of the Australian system differs
from the American system. All bankruptcy districts in Australia,
which presently are drawn along state and territorial lines, have an
Official Receiver'08 and officers to assist the Official Receiver in the
performance of the Official Receiver's ftmctions.'0 9 In addition,
there must be a trustee."0 The Official Receiver may or may not
serve as the Official Trustee."'
Like in the United States,
bankruptcy in Australia may be initiated by either the debtor 2 or by
- Id. § 116(2).
...Id § 15.
" The Official Receiver may delegate powers or functions to an officer of the
department. Id. § 15(4). The Official Receivers act on behalf of the Official Trustee and are
in turn overseen by the Inspector-General. The Inspector-General is responsible for the
general administration of the Act and has the powers conferred on him by the Act. Because
the Inspector-General is empowered to review decisions of the Official Receivers, the
Inspector-General may exercise any of the powers of the Official Receivers. Id. § 11 (2)-(3).
"' See Bankruptcy Act, 1966, § 18 (Austl.). The duties of the trustee of the estate of the
bankrupt are contained in § 19, which was amended and simplified by the 1996 amendments.
The duties include the following: (1) "notifying the bankrupt's creditors of the bankruptcy"
and providing information to creditors; (2) "determining whether the estate includes
property that can be realized to pay a dividend to creditors"; (3) reporting to creditors within
three months on their likelihood of a dividend; (4) determining whether the debtor has made
a voidable transfer of property; (5) recovering property for the benefit of creditors; (6)
ensuring that the debtor discharges his or her duties; (7) reporting possible offenses to be
prosecuted; and (8) avoiding any unnecessary expense in the administration of the estate. Id.
§ 19. It is possible in Australia to have two trustees appointed. In such circumstances,
property vests in the trustees asjoint tenants. Id. § 158.
.. Id § 18(8). If the trustee is a private individual, the person is known as a "registered
trustee." See id. § 154A.
"' Id. § 54. The presentation of a debtor's petition for bankruptcy must be preceded by
presentation of a declaration of intention to present a petition. Id. § 54A. Before accepting
the declaration, the Official Receiver must ensure that the debtor is aware of procedures for
dealing with the debtor's financial affairs and the availability of advice and guidance about
how the debtor can deal with her financial difficulties. Id. § 54D. So long as it appears to the
Official Receiver that the debtor is entitled to present the declaration and it is in the
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creditors."1 If the debtor voluntarily becomes bankrupt, she may
choose the trustee. If a creditor imposes bankruptcy, the creditor
chooses the trustee and may move to appoint a registered trustee to
the office of trustee in place of the Official Trustee." 4 Trustees are
given broad powers over the debtor's assets." 5
A debtor may voluntarily become bankrupt by presenting a
debtor's petition to the Official Receiver." 6 There are three primary
types of debtor's petitions that may be received-those by individual
debtors, those by partners of a partnership, 7 and those by joint
debtors who are not partners."" The Official Receiver must accept
the petition unless one of three exceptions is present." 9 When the
Official Receiver
endorses the petition, the debtor is officially
20
bankrupt.

The creditor can achieve the same result by obtaining a
sequestration order against the estate of the debtor. 2' But unlike in
the United States, 22 for a creditor to commence the bankruptcy, the
petition must be founded on an act of bankruptcy 2 3 This act of
prescribed form, then the declaration will be accepted. Id. § 54C.
1

CompareII U.S.C. § 303(b) with Bankruptcy Act, 1966, § 44 (Austl.).

Bankruptcy Act, 1966, § 157 (Austl.).
See id. §§ 134-35. For example, they can sell property, carry on a bankrupt's business,
institute and defend legal proceedings, and lease the debtor's property.
"6 Id. § 55(1). Like in the United States, a statement of affairs must accompany the
petition. Id. § 55(2).
17
Id. § 56A.
1 Id. § 57.
...The three reasons for rejecting the petition under current law are that it fails to
"5

comply with the approved form, that there is no accompanying statement of affairs, or that
the Official Receiver views the statement of affairs as being inadequate. Id. § 55(3). When
accepting a debtor's petition, the Official Receiver is obligated to provide the debtor with
certain information prescribed by applicable regulations. See id. § 55(3A).
Id. § 55 (4A).
121 See id. § 43.
22
In the United States, the standard to initiate an involuntary proceeding is that the
debtor is not paying his or her debts as they become due. See 11 U.S.C. 303(h) (1) (2000).
" Bankruptcy Act, 1966, § 43 (Austl.). Section 40 of the Bankruptcy Act defines acts of
bankruptcy as follows:
(1) A debtor commits an act of bankruptcy in each of the following cases:
(a) if in Australia or elsewhere he or she makes a conveyance or assignment
of his or her property for the benefit of his or her creditors generally;
(b) if in Australia or elsewhere:
(i) he or she makes a conveyance, transfer, settlement or other
disposition of his or her property or of any part of his or her
property;

HeinOnline -- 18 Bankr. Dev. J. 320 2001-2002

2002]

Can'tPay YourDebts, Mate?

(ii) he or she creates a charge on his or her property or on any part of
his or her property;
(iii) he or she makes a payment; or
(iv) he or she incurs an obligation;
that would, if he or she became a bankrupt, be void as against the trustee;
(c) if,with intent to defeat or delay his or her creditors:
(i) he or she departs or remains out of Australia;
(ii) he or she departs from his or her dwelling-house or usual place of
business;
(iii) he or she otherwise absents himself or herself, or
(iv) he or she begins to keep house;
(d) if(i) execution has been issued against him or her under process of a
court and any of his or her property has, in consequence, either
been sold by the sheriff or held by the sheriff for 21 days; or
(ii) execution has been issued against him or her under process of a
court and has been returned unsatisfied;
(da) if the debtor presents to the Official Receiver a declaration under section
54A(e) if, at a meeting of any of his or her creditors:
(i) he or she consents to present a debtor's petition under this Act and
does not, within 7 days from the date on which he or she so
consented, present the petition; or
(ii) he or she consents to sign an authority under section 188, and does
not, within 7 days from the date on which he or she so consented,
sign such an authority and inform the chairman of the meeting, in
writing, of the name of the person in whose favour the authority has
been signed;
(f) if, at a meeting of any of his or her creditors, he or she admits that he or
she is in insolvent circumstances and, having been requested by a
resolution of a majority of the creditors present at the meeting either in
person or by attorney to bring his or her affairs under the provisions of
this Act, he or she does not, within 7 days from the date of the meeting,
either:
(i) present a debtor's petition; or
(ii) sign an authority under section 188 and inform the chair of the
meeting, in writing, of the name of the person in whose favour the
authority has been signed;
(g) if a creditor who has obtained against the debtor a final judgment or final
order, being a judgment or order the execution of which has not been
stayed, has served on the debtor in Australia or, by leave of the Court,
elsewhere, a bankruptcy notice under this Act and the debtor does not:
(i) where the notice was served in Australia-within the time specified
in the notice; or
(ii) where the notice was served elsewhere-within the time fixed for
the purpose by the order giving leave to effect the service;
comply with the requirements of the notice or satisfy the Court that he or
she has a counter-claim, set-off or cross demand equal to or exceeding the
amount of the judgment debt or sum payable under the final order, as the
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bankruptcy must have occurred within six months of the
presentation of the petition. 12 4 These acts include the intentional
act to delay or defeat creditors, failure to have an execution against
the debtor satisfied, and failure to comply with a bankruptcy notice,
by far the most common act of bankruptcy'2 A bankruptcy notice is
essentially a document issued by the Official Receiver that demands
payment by a specified period of time. The Official Receiver may

case may be, being a counter-claim, set-off or cross demand that he or she
could not have set up in the action or proceeding in which the judgment
or order was obtained;
(h) if he or she gives notice to any of his or her creditors that he or she has
suspended, or that he or she is about to suspend, payment of his or her
debts;
(ha) if the debtor gives the Official Trustee a debt agreement proposal;
(hb) if a debt agreement proposal given by the debtor to the Official Trustee
is accepted by the debtor's creditors;
(hc) if the debtor breaches a debt agreement;
(hd) if a debt agreement to which the debtor was a party (as a debtor) is
terminated under section 185P or 185Q;
(i) if he or she signs an authority under section 188,
(j) if a meeting of his or her creditors is called in pursuance of such an
authority;
(k) if, without sufficient cause, he or she fails to attend a meeting of his or her
creditors called in pursuance of such an authority;
(1) if, having been required by a special resolution of a meeting of his or her
creditors so called to execute a deed of assignment or a deed of
arrangement or to present a debtor's petition, he or she fails, without
sufficient cause:
(i) to comply with the requirements of this Act as to the execution of
the deed by him or her; or
(ii) to present a debtor's petition within the time specified in the
resolution;
as the case may be;
(m) if a deed of assignment or a deed of arrangement executed by him or her
under Part X or a composition accepted by a meeting of his or her
creditors under that Part is declared to be void by the Court or is
terminated by the Court or the creditors under that Part or such a
composition is set aside by the Court under that Part;
(n) if a composition or scheme of arrangement accepted by the debtor's
creditors under Division 6 of part IV is annulled by the Court.
12'
Bankruptcy Act, 1966, § 44 (Austl.). The requirement of an act of bankruptcy
hearkens back to the English common lav model. See supra notes 4-6 and accompanying text.
M See ANDREW KEAY, INSOLVENCY: PERSONAL AND CORPORATE LAW AND PRACTICE 40-41
(3d ed. 1998).
" Bankruptcy Act, 1966, §§ 41, 4 0(1)(g) (Austl.).
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issue a bankruptcy notice following receipt of an application 1 7by a
creditor who has obtained a final judgment against the debtor. 1
Creditors' meetings are somewhat different in Australia than in
the United States. The trustee may convene a meeting of creditors
at any time in order to obtain their views, 128 but the trustee is only
required to convene a meeting under certain circumstances,
including if the creditors so direct the trustee pursuant to a
resolution, if one-quarter of the creditors measured by the dollar
amount of the debt they hold make a written request, or if less than
one-quarter of the creditors make a written request and also provide
security sufficient to cover the costs of holding the meeting. 12
Notice of the creditors' meetings is to be given in writing to all
creditors of the debtor of whom the trustee is aware.130
Australian bankruptcy law is in essence a hybrid of American
chapter 7 and chapter 13. It imposes the financial obligations of
each American chapter on the Australian debtor. Australian
bankrupts must relinquish certain nonexempt property, 131 as must
American chapter 7 debtors. Australian bankrupts must also, if
able, repay their debts from future income,3 2 as is required of
chapter 13 debtors in the United States. The critical difference is
that American debtors must do one or the other. No American
debtor is legally obligated to do both.
In Australia, as soon as an individual becomes bankrupt, all of
his property that will be divisible among his creditors, including all
rights in relation to the property that the bankrupt could have
exercised had he not become bankrupt, vests immediately in the
registered trustee of the bankruptcy estate. This generally includes

Id. § 41. The judgment must be final, and the order cannot have been stayed.
By contrast, in the United States the meeting of creditors is mandatory. 11 U.S.C.
§ 341(a) (2000) (-Within a reasonable time after the order for relief .... the United States
trustee shall convene and preside at a meeting of creditors.").
...Similarly, Creditors' Committees, known as Committees of Inspection, are also
discretionary and are typically appointed only when the trustee believes that some of the
creditors have special knowledge that will be of assistance in administering the estate. See
Bankruptcy Act, 1966, § 70 (Austl.).
'* Id. § 64A The notice must set out the full name and residential address of the
bankrupt and, in the case of a first meeting, any trade or business name used by the bankrupt.
The notice must advise creditors of the time, date, and place of the meeting and must include
the agenda. Id. § 64B.
.. Id. § 116(1).
2' Id. § 139P.
"
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any property
of the bankrupt obtained after filing but prior to
3
discharge.1

Debtors in Australia with sufficient income such that they meet
the "actual income threshold amount" 134 must contribute part of
that income for repayment of debt. There is no provision analogous
to chapter 7, whereby a debtor, irrespective of income, can opt to
retain all future income. However, similar to the American system,
income is defined broadly for bankruptcy purposes.135 Debtors must
provide the trustee with details of all income, including fringe
benefits. Applying the Bankruptcy Act's prescribed formula, if the
income exceeds the threshold amount, the debtor must contribute
a specified percentage of every dollar earned above that amount.
If the debtor's income is below the threshold amount, the debtor
need not contribute income toward the repayment of debt. 3 7 In
calculating the threshold amount, the trustee must take into
account the debtor's dependants. The contribution assessment
period for such payments is twelve months, beginning on the date
of bankruptcy and continuing on a yearly basis until discharge.""
When a debtor is obligated to pay a contribution,
the debtor may
39
not leave Australia without court consent.
Like in the United States, certain property in Australia is
exempt from creditors. 4 ° Common exemptions in both countries
are household furnishings, some tools of trade, a motor vehicle up
'" Id. § 58(1).
Subject to this Act, where a debtor becomes a bankrupt:
(a) the property of the bankrupt, not being after-acquired property, vests forthwith
in the Official Trustee or, if,at the time when the debtor becomes a bankrupt, a
registered trustee becomes the trustee of the estate of the bankrupt by virtue of
section 156A, in that registered trustee; and
(b) after-acquired property of the bankrupt vests, as soon as it is acquired by, or
devolves on, the bankrupt, in the Official Trustee or, if a registered trustee is
the trustee of the estate of the bankrupt, in that registered trustee.
Id. See also id. § 116(1).
'm The amount depends on how many dependants the debtor has and is tied to the
consumer price index. Id. § 139K.
"
See id. § 139L. Income includes annuity and pension payments, voluntary payments to
the debtor, and employment termination payments.
' Id. § 139P. Noncompliant debtors may have their wages or bank accounts garnished
by the trustee.
137 id.

,s

Id. § 139K.
Id. § 139ZU.
Compare 11 U.S.C. § 522 with Bankruptcy Act, 1966, § 116(2) (Austl.).
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to an established dollar amount, and insurance policy benefits.'
One notable distinction between the countries relates to home
exemptions. While homes are not exempt in Australia,142 in the
United States they are typically exempt up to a certain dollar
amount, and in a few jurisdictions-most notably Texas and
Florida-there is an unlimited homestead exemption.
The registered trustee is charged with managing the bankrupt's
estate in a manner that yields the best return for creditors with a
provable debt.'44 Typically, this means an immediate liquidation of
all nonmonetary property for distribution to creditors. However,
the trustee may continue the bankrupt's business as needed to
effectively wind it up.'4 5 As is the case in the United States, the
trustee may also disclaim or abandon property that has no monetary
value to the bankrupt's estate, such as property encumbered
by a
1 46
lien whose value exceeds the value of the collateral.
Generally, once a debtor has been adjudged bankrupt, an
unsecured creditor cannot enforce a provable debt against the
debtor or his or her property, 47 nor can the unsecured creditor
undertake any legal proceedings against the debtor without court
approval. 148 For unsecured creditors who have proved their debts,
the general rule in both America and Australia is one of pro rata
distribution.'
However in each case an extensive list of priority
payments precedes any general distribution to unsecured
creditors. 50 As soon as the trustee has realized sufficient money, she
may begin distributing the estate according to the established
priorities. The bankrupt is entitled to any surplus that remains
following payment in full of all administrative costs and proved
debts (including interest where applicable).
"4 Compare 11 U.S.C. § 522(d) with Bankruptcy Act, 1966, § 116(2) (b)-(d) (Austi.).
.4.Bankruptcy Act, 1966 § 116 (Austl.).
See FLA. CONST. art. X § 4 (2001); TEx. CONST. art. XVI §§ 50-51 (2002).
A creditor with a provable debt has shown that the amount is legally owed by the
debtor and is also legally recoverable as a bankruptcy debt. See Bankruptcy Act, 1966, § 82
(Aust.).
' Id.§134(1) (b).
'
'

Compare 11 U.S.C. § 554 (2000) with Bankruptcy Act, 1966, § 133 (Austl.).
Bankruptcy Act, 1966, § 58(3) (a) (Austl.); see also id. § 5(1) (defining "property" to
include property excluded from the bankruptcy estate).
m 58(3)
r 1§(b).
Compare 11 U.S.C. § 726(b)with Bankruptcy Act, 1966, § 108 (Aus.).
SComparel11 U.S.C. § 507 with Bankruptcy Act, 1966, § 109 (Austl.).
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While unsecured creditors in American and Australia are
treated largely alike, the same cannot be said for secured creditors.
In the United States the automatic stay generally applies to secured
creditors as well.15 By contrast, in Australia there are effectively four
courses of action available to secured creditors,152 and the most
common approach largely removes the creditor from the
bankruptcy proceeding. The first approach is for the creditor to
rely entirely on the security without lodging a proof of debt; that is,
the creditor may just foreclose, with the caveat that any excess
realized by the creditor must be returned to the trustee. 53 The
second option is that the secured creditor may acquire the security
independent of the bankruptcy, and prove for any deficiency
amount which remains. 5 4 Essentially, the secured portion of an
undersecured creditor's claim may be realized outside of the
bankruptcy process, with the unsecured portion of the claim dealt
with in bankruptcy. The third option is for the creditor to
surrender the security to the trustee to benefit all creditors and
prove for the entire value of the debt.' The final option is for the
"' 11 U.S.C. § 362(a). The American Bankruptcy Code is concerned primarily with
preserving the value of the secured creditor's lien. According to the legislative history when
the Code was drafted, "[slecured creditors should not be deprived of the benefit of their
bargain." H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 339 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.CAN. 5963, 6295; see
also Bankers Life Ins. Co. v. Alyucan Interstate Corp. (In reAlyucan Interstate Corp.), 12 B.R.
803, 808 n.11 (Bankr. D. Utah 1981). This language should be interpreted in terms of
economic value, not strict contractual benefits. In reAlyucan Interstate Corp., 12 B.R at 808
n.ll. Congress went on to add, "Though the creditor might not receive his bargain in kind,
the purpose of the section is to insure that the secured creditor receives in value essentially
what he bargained for." H.R REP. No. 95-595, at 339; see alsoIn reAlyucan Interstate Corp., 12
B.R. at 808 n.11. Thus, the Code presumes that the stay will continue to apply to secured
creditors during the pendency of the bankruptcy unless that value is in question. The most
common method of a secured creditor proving the jeopardy of its financial interest is by
showing a lack of "adequate protection," meaning that the value of the creditor's property
interest is being diminished by the bankruptcy proceeding. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 361, 362(d) (1).
A secured creditor who can prove a lack of adequate protection may have the stay lifted and
can immediately foreclose. To do so, as a practical matter, the creditor must show both that it
is undersecured and that the value of its collateral is declining in value. Even if this can be
proved, the debtor may still maintain the stay in regard to the secured creditor by providing
the creditor with some value that maintains the creditor's economic position, such as
replacement liens on other property or periodic cash payments. 11 U.S.C. § 361.
152 See Bankruptcy Act,
1966, § 90 (Austl.).
'-" Id. § 90(1). This allows an oversecured creditor in all instances to obtain payment
outside of bankruptcy. See id. § 107.
Id. § 90(3).
Id. § 90(2). This is typically done only when the creditor is vastly undersecured. See
DENNIS ROSE, LEWIS' AUSTRALIAN BANKRuPTcYLAw 119 (11th ed. 1999).
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creditor to estimate the security's value and prove for the difference
between the debt and that value.""6 The second option is the norm.
Unlike the United States, where the secured creditor must
participate in the bankruptcy absent relief from the automatic stay,
this second option allows the secured creditor to remove itself from
the bankruptcy except for the need to prove for any deficiency.
While Australian debtors are generally discharged from
bankruptcy three years after they file their statement of affairs,' 57
there are two noted exceptions. First, objections to the discharge
may be lodged by the trustee or the Official Receiver.'
Objections
typically question whether the debtor has cooperated and behaved
appropriately throughout the bankruptcy. 9 The filing of the
objection may delay discharge.'O Second, in limited circumstances,
a debtor may apply for early discharge six months after filing the
statement of affairs. 61 Once the discharge is obtained, as in the
United States, the debtor is discharged from most, but not all,
provable debts. 62 Nondischargeable debts include those incurred
Bankruptcy Act, 1966, § 90(4)-(5) (Austl.).
Id. § 149(4).
" Id.§ 149B.
Id. § 149D (1).
Such actions may delay discharge until five or eight years after the prescribed date,
which is typically the date of the filing of the statement of affairs. See id. § 149A(2).
,61Id. § 149S (Austl.). Subdivision C of Division 3 sets out the criteria for eligibility for
early discharge, which include the following: when the application is made there is no money
to pay the trustee's compensation and expenses or the creditors' dividends; there has been no
voidable transaction on the part of the debtor; and the income likely to be derived from the
debtor during the year following the application will not likely exceed the threshold income
amount.). Id. at § 149T.
.. Bankruptcy Act, 1966, § 153 (Austl.). Section 153 provides in relevant part:
(2) The discharge of a bankrupt from a bankruptcy does not:
(a) release the bankrupt from:
(i) a debt on a recognizance; or
(ii) a debt with which the bankrupt is chargeable at the suit of the sheriff
or other public officer on a bail bond entered into for the
appearance of a person prosecuted for an offence against a law of the
Commonweaith or of a State or Territory of the Commonwealth;
(aa) release the bankrupt from liability to pay an amount to the trustee under
subsection 139ZG(1);
(b) release the bankrupt from a debt incurred by means of fraud or a
fraudulent breach of trust to which he or she was a party or a debt of
which he or she has obtained forbearance by fraud;
(c) subject to any order of the Court made under subsection (2A), release
the bankrupt from any liability under a maintenance agreement or
maintenance order; or
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by fraud or stemming from a maintenance agreement or order.' 6s
Moreover, the discharge does not affect the rights of secured
creditors, who may look to the security to obtain repayment for a
debt not proved in bankruptcy. 64
Two notable areas where Australian law is more debtor-friendly
than that of the United States are (1) repeat or serial bankruptcies,
and (2) the nondischargeability of certain debts. As to the former,
serial filings are not expressly limited by Australian bankruptcy law
with the sole exception of section 55 of the Bankruptcy Act, which
provides some limitations on individuals who wish to petition when
their creditors have already petitioned against them.'6' This not
only applies to the period after securing a bankruptcy discharge, but
also to the period during which the person is an undischarged
debtor. As a result, repeat bankrupts now form a significant
number of the bankruptcies filed in Australia each year. 166 As to the
(d)

release the bankrupt from any liability under a pecuniary penalty order
or interstate pecuniary penalty order.
(2A) The Court may order that the discharge of a bankrupt from bankruptcy shall
operate to release the bankrupt, to such extent and subject to such conditions as
the Court thinks fit, from liability to pay arrears due under a maintenance
agreement or maintenance order.
(3) The discharge of a bankrupt from a bankruptcy does not affect the right of a
secured creditor, or any person claiming through or under him or her, to realize or
otherwise deal with his or her security:
(a) if the secured creditor has not proved in the bankruptcy for any part of
the secured debt-for the purpose of obtaining payment of the secured
debt; or
(b) if the secured creditor has proved in the bankruptcy for part of the
secured debt-for the purpose of obtaining payment of the part of the
secured debt for which he or she has not proved in the bankruptcy;
and, for the purposes of enabling the secured creditor or a person claiming
through or under him or her so to realize or deal with his or her security, but not
otherwise, the secured debt, or the part of the secured debt, as the case may be,
shall be deemed not to have been released by the discharge of the bankrupt.
(4) The discharge of a bankrupt from a bankruptcy does not release from any
liability a person who, at the date on which the bankrupt became a bankrupt
(a) was a partner or a co-trustee with the bankrupt or was jointly bound or
had made ajoint contract with the bankrupt; or
(b) was surety or in the nature of a surety for the bankrupt.
(5) Where a bankrupt has been discharged from a bankruptcy, all proceedings
taken in or in respect of the bankruptcy shall be deemed to have been validly taken.
'0 Id.§153(2)(b).
"4
Id. § 153(3).
See id. § 55.
'
The Insolvency and Trustee Service in Australia in a relatively recent study found that
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latter, Australian law provides
for far fewer nondischargeable debts
167
than does American law.

IV. TWO MANIFESTATIONS OF A PHILOSOPHICAL DEMARCATION

While there are many differences between the two bankruptcy
systems, I would like to focus briefly on two primary areas that
reflect very different philosophical concepts of what a personal
bankruptcy system should accomplish. The first is the broader
emphasis on preserving the fresh start in America. The second-a
related point-is the greater flexibility afforded secured creditors in
Australia in realizing their security.
A.

The Fresh Start

The concept of a fresh start for an individual debtor can be
broken into three component parts, all of which have been
discussed previously in some depth. Each of these parts is treated
differently by United States and Australian bankruptcy law. The first
relates directly to what must be contributed by a debtor to obtain a
discharge of prebankruptcy obligations and to obtain the benefits of
the accompanying injunction to prevent postbankruptcy collection
efforts by prebankruptcy creditors. The second component is the
degree to which certain property is exempted. The third element is
the protection the law provides against certain forms of
discrimination against bankrupts."'e

eight percent of all filings were repeat bankrupts. See Insolvency and Trustee Service
Australia, Profiles of Debtors: Who Became Bankrupt or Entered into Debt Agreements in 1997, at 19
(Canberra: Insolvency and Trustee Service Australia 1998).
"' Compare 11 U.S.C. § 523 (eighteen nondischargeable debts) with Bankruptcy Act,
1966, § 153(2) (Austl.), see supranote 162.
' A fourth and related element is the question of repeat filings. There is no question
that repeat filing by bankrupts exacts costs. The societal costs of repeated, abusive bankruptcy
filings have been noted in a number of contexts. For example, while taxes benefit everyone
by providing resources for health care, education, security, and other services, repeat
bankruptcy filings have been used, at least in part, to avoid a tax liability or to avoid paying an
acknowledged tax debt. A related point is that when debt is discharged, it generally raises the
cost of doing business for any creditor against whom the debt has been discharged. To
compensate for these increased costs, creditors are likely to raise the cost of credit by charging
all future borrowers more in the form of a higher interest rate. For a fuller discussion of this
problem, see Paul B. Lewis, The Repeat Bankruptcy Filer Some Economic Considerations,10 NEW
DIRECrIONS IN BANKRt. 18 (Aug. 2000), available at http://vw.law.gov.au/aghome/
commaff/itsa/frame.pubs.html.
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Under current American law, the concept of a fresh start
discharge is broad.1 69 The United States on the whole 71 takes the
fresh start a degree further than does Australia or any other
industrialized nation.1 7' The idea of a fresh start for the honest but
unlucky debtor is firmly rooted in Anglo-American bankruptcy
jurisprudence. As early as 1706, English Parliament passed a
bankruptcy act that contained a provision for the discharge of the
7
debtor from prebankruptcy debts.1'

Blackstone stated that through

" Discharge is largely embodied in § 524 of the Code, which provides a bankrupt a postdischarge injunction against any collection effort of a debt that has been discharged in
bankruptcy. The injunction is permanent; it replaces the automatic stay which prevented
collection efforts against the bankrupt for prepetition obligations during the course of the
bankruptcy. Any creditor who violates the injunction can be sanctioned. And while a
bankrupt may voluntarily opt to "reaffirm" a debt to restore the legal obligation to repay a
debt that would otherwise have been discharged in bankruptcy, this reaffirmation must be
bankrupt-initiated and can only be accomplished following the employment of detailed
procedures intended to ensure that the reaffirmation agreement is consistent with the
debtor's best interests.
" It is worth emphasizing that despite the dominant role the idea of a fresh start plays in
bankruptcy rhetoric, it is not absolute and unconditional, and in places, American law is more
limiting than Australian law. There are four primary exceptions to the right to a fresh start in
the United States. The first, embodied in § 707(b) of the Code, is when the granting of relief
would be a substantial abuse of the Code. The second, contained in § 523, is that some
liabilities, such as for financing obtained under false pretenses, for maintenance of a child or
a former spouse, or for willful and malicious injury-are excluded from discharge. American
law provides for eighteen nondischargeable debts, far more than does Australian law. Compare
11 U.S.C. § 523 with Bankruptcy Act, 1966, § 153(2). The third-based on a long history in
American jurisprudence that discharge only be available to honest debtors-is that discharge
can be denied for debtor misconduct during the bankruptcy process. And the fourth is that
the right to bankruptcy and the accompanying fresh start can be denied for certain repeat, or
serial bankruptcy filers. As for the second and fourth exceptions, United States law places
greater hurdles on access to a fresh start than does Australian law.
171 In common law countries, the fresh start is a significant concern of bankruptcy policy.
For example, the Australian Law Reform Commission stated that one of the principles to
guide modem insolvency law in Australia is that "[t]he end result of an insolvency
administration, particularly as it affects individuals, should, with very limited exceptions, be
the effective relief or release from the financial liabilities and obligations of the insolvent."
Australian Law Reform Commission, GENERAL INSOLVENCY INQUIRY, 1 ALRC REP. No. 45 at
para. 33 (1988).
By contrast, in civil law countries, bankruptcy is generally either not an option or
available only after the exhaustion of all other avenues of relief and, where available, retains a
significant stigma. SeeJohanna Niemi-Kiesiliinen, ChangingDirections in Consumer Bankruptcy
Law and Pracice in Europe and USA, 20 J. CONSUMER POL'Y 133 (1997); Johanna NiemiKiesildinen, ConsumerBankruptcy in Comparison:Do We Cure a Market Failureor a Social Problem?,
37 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 473 (1999). For an extensive discussion of the breadth of the fresh
start globally, see Rafael Efrat, The Fresh-StartPolicy in Bankruptcy in Modern Day Israel 7 AM.
BANKR. INsT. L. REV. 555, 571-77 (1999).
17
See4 Ann. c. 17, § 8 (1705) (Eng).
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the discharge "the bankrupt becomes a clear man again; and, by the
a[ss]i[s]tance of his allowance and his own indu[s]try, may become
a u[s]eful member of the commonwealth." 3 According to the
United States Supreme Court in Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, bankruptcy
"gives to the honest but unfortunate debtor who surrenders for
distribution the property which he owns at the time of bankruptcy, a
new opportunity in life and a clear field for future effort,
unhampered by the pressure and discouragement of preexisting
debt."7 4 Related to giving the debtor a second chance, of course, is
the decreased likelihood that the debtor will ultimately become
dependent upon public support.
Other justifications for a broad discharge have been offered as
well. First, the discharge shifts the burden of overextensions of
credit from debtors to creditors, who are better able to bear these
costs. Second, requiring payment of future income comes too close
to a violation of the involuntary servitude provision of the
Thirteenth Amendment.7 5 Third, the Australian model, which
requires payment from future income, is based on historical and
cultural factors that do not exist in the United States-namely, the
focus on bankruptcy as primarily a mechanism for creditor debt
collection.7 6 And fourth, the discharge is ethical and humane.
By contrast, the Australian discharge is narrower. This results
primarily from the presence of a single bankruptcy approach that
presumes a potential mandatory repayment out of future earnings.
There has been little support for a single chapter approach for all
consumer debtors in the United States.7 7 The narrower treatment
2 WILJAM BLACKSTONE,

COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND *484.
292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934).
z The Thirteenth Amendment provides in part: "Neither slavery nor involuntary
servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted,
shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction." U.S. CONST.
amend. XIII, § 2.
"7 See Jacob S. Ziegel, The Philosophy and Design of Contemporary Consumer Bankruptcy
Systems: A Canada-UnitedStates Comparison,37 OSGOODE HALL LJ.205 (1999).
" In discussing the National Bankruptcy Review Commission's Working Group on
Consumer Bankruptcy, Professor Elizabeth Warren wrote: "Ultimately the single chapter
concept served the quite remarkable function of demonstrating that old enemies could
become good friends when concepts for sweeping change were in the air. For perhaps the
only time in the consumer bankruptcy debates, debtors, creditors, judges, and trustees could
reach consensus: they did not want-indeed, would not tolerate- a single chapter consumer
bankruptcy system." Elizabeth Warren, A PrincipledApproach to ConsumerBankruptcy, 71 Am.
BANKR. LJ.483, 489 (1997). But see Hon. Dorothy Eisenberg, Consumer Debtors: Combining
Chapters 7 and 13,4 AM. BANKR.INST. L. REv. 511,511 (1996) ("It may now be appropriate to
'7
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afforded an Australian debtor's "fresh start" appears to provide a
number of disincentives to file for bankruptcy. The obvious
disincentive is the requirement that any debtor may potentially need
to make compulsory monetary contributions out of future income.
There are, however, other factors that serve to narrow the Australian
fresh start. For example, the Australian bankrupt is required to
reveal his or her status as a bankrupt when applying for credit which
exceeds a certain dollar amount, 17 surrender his or her passport to
the bankruptcy trustee during the period in bankruptcy, 79 and
critically for a debtor engaged in business, an Australian bankrupt
cannot manage a business without obtaining court approval to do
SO.

180

The second element of the fresh start is exemption law, which
serves to protect certain statutorily identified property. As noted,
exemption laws form a core feature'' of U.S. debtor-creditor law,
both under state law and the Code,'l 2seen, for example, in the broad
range of allowable homestead exemptions. 3 In Australia, the home
is not exempt. The inability of an Australian debtor to save his
home marks a major difference in the philosophy of the fresh start
policy in Australia and the United States.
As for the third element, Australian bankruptcy law does not
provide for the protections against bankrupts that are found in the
Code.
Section 525 of the Code forbids certain forms of
governmental and private discrimination solely because a person
was a debtor in bankruptcy or failed to repay debts discharged in
bankruptcy. While these protections are not absolute,8' they are
combine chapters 7 and 13 when dealing with consumer debtors, forcing the debtor to
contribute a portion of their future income to repay some of the debt."). See alsoJACKSON,
supra note 52, at 256-58 (questioning justification for federally mandated exemption for
postbankruptcy income).
'7 Bankruptcy Act, 1966, § 269 (Austl.).
'
Id. § 77(a) (ii).
See Corporations Act, 2001, § 206B(3)-(4), 206G (Austl.). See generally Rosalind
Mason, ConsumerBankruptcies.An Australian Perspective,37 OSGOODE HALL LJ. 449 (1999).
181 Exemptions have formed a part of American bankruptcy law from its beginning. For
example, the Bankruptcy Act of 1800 contained wholly federal exemptions. Bankruptcy Act
of 1800, ch.19, 2 Star. 19,30-31,34.
'7
All states currently have exemption statutes. The Bankruptcy Code has its own. See 11
U.S.C. § 522 (2000).
'
Seesupra note 35.
For example, they provide no protection from discrimination for anyone who has not
been a debtor in bankruptcy. Thus, those who have not been debtors in bankruptcy can
presumably be discriminated against for their failure to repay their debts. Second, even as to
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meaningful contributing factors to insure that American debtors get
a broader fresh start than their Australian counterparts.
The critical question in analyzing the fresh start and its
ramifications is when the "fresh start" instead becomes a "head
start... When the fresh start tilts in that direction, it impacts the
balance between debtor and creditor interests that always exist in
the bankruptcy context. The ongoing concern is that while in
isolation the fresh start looks wholly desirable, an increased benefit
to debtors will result in a corresponding harm to creditors, and this
corresponding harm to creditors ultimately will be borne by all
future borrowers in the form of reduced availability of credit, more
expensive credit, or both. There is thus a delicate balance to strike.
The Australian limitation on discharge relative to the American
approach reflects different values at the core of the question of how
bankruptcy costs should be allocated.
B.

Treatment of Secured Creditors

The second area that reflects different basic concepts of how
losses should be allocated is the respective treatment each country
gives secured creditors. Secured creditors in Australia are given
broader latitude in dealing with bankrupt debtors than are their
American counterparts. 86 The norm for secured creditors is to
those who were debtors in bankruptcy, § 525 offers relatively limited help. Although the issue
has not been widely considered, the majority of courts that have addressed the issue have read
the word "solely" literally, ruling that a government or private employer may consider the fact
that a person was a debtor in bankruptcy or failed to repay a discharged debt along with other
factors in reaching a decision regarding the former debtor. See, e.g., Laracuente v. Chase
Manhattan Bank, 891 F.2d 17, 23 (1st Cir. 1989) ("[A] fundamental element of a § 525(b)
claim is that the insolvency, the filing of bankruptcy, or the discharge of a debt is the sole
reason for discriminatory treatment by an employer."); Comeaux v. Brown & Williamson
Tobacco Co., 915 F.2d 1264, 1268 (9th Cir. 1990); Will Rogers Jockey & Polo Club, Inc. v.
Okla. Horse Racing Comm'n (In re Will Rogers Jockey & Polo Club), 111 B.R. 948, 953
(Bankr. N.D. Okla. 1990). In addition, although the fact that a person was a debtor in
bankruptcy may not be the sole basis for the types of adverse conduct covered by § 525, the
facts and circumstances that led the debtor to file bankruptcy may be. Thus, if a person was
led to bankruptcy because of his financial irresponsibility or substance abuse, the person may
legally be discriminated against because of the financial irresponsibility or substance abuse.
Finally, the limitation on nongovernmental discrimination is narrow and forbids adverse
treatment of bankrupt debtors only in regards to employment.
" The term "head start" was employed by Justice Harlan to describe debtors whom he
believed received too good of a deal. Lines v. Frederick, 400 U.S. 18, 21 (1970) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting).
" Recall that Australian secured creditors have four primary options. They may (1) rely
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largely opt out of the bankruptcy. 187 If the creditor is undersecured,
as is most commonly the case, it can look directly to the collateral to
realize the secured portion of the obligation, and then participate in
the bankruptcy only to attempt to collect on the undersecured
portion of its claim that cannot be realized directly from the
collateral. The Australian opt-out option for secured creditors is
absolute-courts cannot prevent such secured creditors from so
acting.
This opt-out option does not exist in the United States.
American bankruptcy law forbids it.Iss The rationale for this,
presumably, is that no one would agree to be a part of a bankruptcy
proceeding unless the proceeding were mandatory for all
creditors. 89 The result is that American secured creditors bear
bankruptcy related costs that their Australian counterparts do not.
Two related points follow: first, the availability of credit will likely be

entirely on the security without lodging a proof of debt, (2) realize the security independent
of the bankruptcy, and prove for any deficiency amount which remains, (3) surrender the
security to the trustee to benefit all creditors and prove for the entire value of the debt, or (4)
estimate the security's value and prove for the difference between the debt and that value.
Bankruptcy Act, 1966, § 90(2)-(5).
"
See supranotes 152-56 and accompanying text. See also KEAY, supranote 125, at 137-38.
The only real exception is that the stay may be lifted by a secured creditor pursuant to
11 U.S.C. § 362(d) either for cause, including the lack of adequate protection, or if the debtor
has no equity in the property and the property is not needed for an effective reorganization.
In See generallyJACKSON, supra note 52. In addition, courts have uniformly held that it
violates public policy for a party to agree to waive the right to file a bankruptcy petition. See In
rejenkins Court Assoc., 181 B.R. 33, 36 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1995) (ipso facto clauses precluding
right to seek bankruptcy protection per se invalid). It may, however, be possible to waive the
bankruptcy automatic stay, though a motion for a court order enforcing the waiver is
necessary. See In re Cheeks, 167 B.R. 817, 818-19 (Bankr. D.S.C. 1994) (enforcing prepetition
agreement stating that mortgagor would not oppose mortgagee's relief from stay motion in
the event of bankruptcy). Increasingly, courts have seen prepetition waivers of the stay as just
one factor in considering whether they should ultimately grant relief from the stay. Compare
In re Powers, 170 B.R. 480, 482-83 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1994) (enforcing prepetition waiver) with
Farm Credit of Cent. Fla., ACA v. Polk, 160 B.R. 870, 873-74 (M.D. Fa. 1993) (refusing to
enforce prepetition waiver). For a more complete discussion of this issue, see Marshall E.
Tracht, ContractualBankruptcy Waivers: Reconciling Theory, Practice,and Law, 82 CORNELL L. REV.
301 (1997).
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affected,"9 and second, secured creditors' costs will be reflected in
the increased interest rates charged future borrowers. 9 '
CONCLUSION

Personal bankruptcies have never been more common in the
United States.19 2 Numerous factors undoubtedly explain this
phenomenon. Whether specific elements of bankruptcy law directly
impact the rate of filing is a subject of debate. 93 A comparison with
other bankruptcy systems and the incentives they provide for
bankruptcy filing may be instructive. The Australian approach to
personal bankruptcy strikes a different and interesting balance
between the rights of debtors and creditors, and in doing so reflects
a different ideology at the core of its bankruptcy system than is seen
in the United States.

'9 The Australians have expressly noted this concern. The Australian Law Reform
Commission stated: "[A]s a matter of economics, it would be undesirable to impede the flow
of credit by devaluing the security or other rights which a creditor may require as a condition
of giving credit." Australian Law Reform Commission, GENERAL INSOLVENCYINQUIRY, 1 ALRC
REP. No. 45, at para. 97 (1988).
"' For a lengthy discussion of how opt-out options for secured creditors effect corporate
bankruptcy in the United States and Australia, see Paul B. Lewis, Trouble Down Under: Some
Thoughts on the Australian-American CorporateBankruptcy Divide, 2001 UTAH L. REV. 189.
' According to recent data, "[t]he number of new bankruptcies filed during the second
quarter of calendar year 2001 (April 1 to June 30) rose 24.5 percent over the same period [of
2000.] Filings increased from 321,729 to 400,394, making this the highest three-month
period ever," and putting bankruptcy filings for 2001 on a pace to eclipse the largest total ever
set in 1998, when 1,442,549 new cases were filed. During the twelve-month period ending
June 30, 2001, there were 972,659 chapter 7 filings and 403,418 Chapter 13 filings. Press
Release, American Bankruptcy Institute, New Bankruptcy FilingsBreak QuarterlyRecord (Aug. 24,
2001)
(citing
the
Administrative
Office
of
the
U.
S.
Courts),
at
http://wvw.abiworld.org/stats/ ag2401.html.
.. Compare William J. Woodward,Jr. & Richard S. Woodward, Exemptions as an Incentive to
Voluntary Bankruptcy: An Empirical Study, 57 AM. BANKR. L.J. 53 (1983) with Michelle J. White,
Why it Pays to Filefor Bankruptcy:A CriticalLook at the Incentives Under U.S. PersonalBankruptcy
Law and a ProposalforChange; 65 U. CH. L. REv. 685 (1998), and Hung-Jen Wang & Michelle
J. White, An Optimal PersonalBankruptcy Procedureand ProposedReforms, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 255
(2000).
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